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THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
OF UNDERBREADTH
WILLIAM E. LEE*
A familiar First Amendment doctrine is the requirement that laws af-
fecting freedom of expression be precisely tailored. One part of precise
tailoring, overbreadth, invalidates laws that include within their reach
actors or circumstances that do not present the danger the government
seeks to avoid.1 But laws can also be improperly tailored because they
are too narrow.2 The concern for underinclusion-when a law targets
some conduct or actors for adverse treatment, yet leaves untouched con-
duct or actors that are indistinguishable in terms of the law's purpose-
originated as an equal protection concept, but since the 1970s has be-
come an increasingly important aspect of First Amendment
methodology.3
* Professor, Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of
Georgia.
1. See, eg., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (fighting words ordinance
invalid because it is susceptible of application to protected speech). See generally Martin H. Redish,
The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1031 (1983).
A law can also be improperly tailored because it does not use the least restrictive means that will
accomplish the government's end. See, eg., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (valid gov-
ernmental purpose cannot be pursued by broad means if the end can be more narrowly achieved).
See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969); Robert
M. Bastress, Jr., Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974). Also, a law can be improperly
tailored because the means chosen do not adequately serve the governmental interest. See, e.g., Vil-
lage of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (striking down an
ordinance that only peripherally promoted the village's substantial interest in protecting the public
from fraudulent solicitations).
2. Professor Nimmer called such laws "overnarrow". MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.06[B] at 2-93 to 97 (1984). See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclu-
sion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REv. 447 (1989).
3. See, eg., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). In Erznoznik, the city
sought to justify as a traffic regulation an ordinance prohibiting drive-in theaters from exhibiting
films containing nudity. The Court noted that while legislatures can generally deal with one part of
a problem without addressing the entire problem, regulations that discriminate on the basis of con-
tent are impermissible unless clear reasons exist for the distinctions. Because a wide variety of scenes
in movies would also distract motorists, no justification existed for distinguishing movies containing
nudity. Id. at 215.
Following the Supreme Court, lower courts began to incorporate underinclusiveness as part of
First Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1986) (ban on inmates
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This is a highly controversial methodology; a law's narrowness may be
attacked as insufficiently promoting a governmental interest, or it may be
defended because of its limited reach. The application of this methodol-
ogy is also puzzling. Sometimes laws that create a slight burden on First
Amendment rights are invalidated because only a few actors are targeted.
In other instances, if the law imposes a minimal burden on free expres-
sion the Court defers to legislative judgments concerning which sources
of a problem the government should regulate.
Recently, in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,4 the Court invalidated a law
that proscribed only those fighting words addressing race, color, creed,
religion, or gender. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, criticized the
Court's use of what he called the "underbreadth" doctrine because it
allows worthless and unprotected speech to go unpunished until a legisla-
ture cures the defect by enacting a broader prohibition.5 Justice Stevens,
in a concurring opinion, also criticized the Court, claiming that its deci-
sion constrained the power of legislatures to make distinctions based on
content; the decision meant that within a category of proscribable con-
tent, the government must either proscribe all speech, or no speech at
all.6 To Justice Stevens, legislatures could reasonably conclude that the
harm caused by racial fighting words was distinct from that caused by
other types of words.7 Justice Scalia, author of the R.A. V. opinion, dis-
claimed any concern for underinclusiveness, and instead stated that the
case rested upon a content-discrimination limitation. Differential treat-
ment of expression is permissible as long as "there is no realistic possibil-
ity that official suppression of ideas is afoot."'
Although R.A. V. leaves many questions about differential treatment
unanswered, it illustrates the tension created by the desirability of equal
treatment and the competing need for distinct treatment. In some in-
receiving newspapers but not magazines found to be underinclusive means of reducing the threat of
fires and clogged toilets); Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1986) (ban on inmates receiving
newspapers and magazines found to be underinclusive means of preventing fires and clogged toilets
because inmates could possess other potentially damaging materials); Mission Trace Invs., Ltd. v.
Small Business Admin., 622 F. Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1985) (SBA's rule preventing loans to "opinion
molders" underinclusive because it allows loans to advertising agencies whose clients include polit-
ical candidates), rev'd on other grounds sub noa. Ascot Dinner Theatre, Ltd. v. Small Business
Admin., 887 F.2d 1024 (10th Cir. 1989).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
5. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 2565.
8. 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
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stances, distinct treatment prevails. For example, sexually oriented ex-
pression is treated differently from political expression.9 The government
may choose which communicators use nonforum properties.10 The gov-
ernment may grant subsidies to some speakers but not others. 1 And
attorney speech concerning pending cases is subject to greater restriction
than the speech of nonparticipants. 2 Yet the importance of equality is
often stated in recent First Amendment cases. The Court believes that
public debate is distorted when the government restricts some speakers
while allowing the participation of others who are similar to the re-
stricted class. As the Court succinctly wrote, "When speakers and sub-
jects are similarly situated, the State may not pick and choose."1 3
Defining whether differential treatment of communicators is permissi-
ble can involve factors other than the characteristics of the communica-
tors. For example, in First National Bank v. Bellotti,14 involving a
restriction on corporate political expression, the Court found the state's
effort to control who spoke on certain issues illegitimate. Thus, the
Court was unwilling to accept the state's claim that there were relevant
characteristics distinguishing the burdened and unburdened classes from
one another. If the Court finds the state's goal to be permissible, it can
give states great latitude in defining the burdened and unburdened
classes. For example, in Leathers v. Medlock,15 the Court upheld a law
9. See, eg., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning of sexually
oriented movie theaters); Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68
VA. L. REv. 203 (1982).
10. See, eg., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (exclusion
of group from interschool mail facilities); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading
Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1219 (1984).
11. See, eg., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (tax exempt status
for veterans' organizations that lobby not available to other lobbying groups). Cf. Rust v. Sullivan,
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Congress may choose not to fund abortion-related speech). See generally
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103
(1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
12. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). Although Gentile concerns speech that has the
possibility of prejudicing judicial proceedings, and press coverage can create that danger, the Court's
analysis distinguished attorneys from other speakers on grounds such as fiduciary obligations that do
not apply to the press. Moreover, the analysis in Gentile focused on the difference between partici-
pants and nonparticipants, rather than the difference between attorneys and the press. Cf. Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (even the press can be restrained from publishing materi-
als obtained during discovery if the press is a litigant). Gentile is outside of the scope of this Article.
13. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
14. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See infra notes 51-59, 243-54 and accompanying text.
15. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991). See infra notes 216-41 and accompanying text.
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that taxed cable television subscriptions and exempted newspaper sales
and subscription magazine sales. Because raising revenue was a legiti-
mate goal, and the law was viewpoint neutral, the differential treatment
was accepted without any assessment of whether there were relevant dif-
ferences among the media.
This Article explains why the Supreme Court approaches differential
treatment in such diverse ways. Because the topic of differential treat-
ment of categories of expression has been explored elsewhere,16 this Arti-
cle primarily focuses on differential treatment of communicators. In
addition, because the press is frequently singled out for special treatment,
the author discusses the question whether the press should be regarded as
special. This Article argues that there are powerful reasons for prevent-
ing the government from discriminating among members of the press.1 7
These reasons also require that the government not discriminate between
the press and nonpress communicators.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND UNDERINCLUSIVE LAWS
A. Equal Freedom or Equal Suppression?
While the press plays an important role in our society,"8 the Court-
with the exception of Justice Stewart's lonely voice--consistently re-
jects the claim that the press deserves special First Amendment protec-
tion.20 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,2 however, the
Court ruled that a law favoring the press over nonpress corporations did
not violate equal protection because of the unique role of the press.22 In
16. See, eg., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); Stephan, supra note 9.
17. This Article does not address differential treatment of print and electronic media, which
arguably rests upon broadcaster use of the electromagnetic spectrum. A vast literature criticizes the
rationales for distinct treatment of broadcasting. See, eg., MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY
WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES (1986). This Article is concerned with differential treatment of
speakers in instances in which, for the purpose of regulation, no relevant characteristics justify the
treatment.
18. See, e-g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (the press as a handmaiden of
effective judicial administration has an impressive record of service over several centuries).
19. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 576 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (claiming that
newsrooms should not be subject to police searches); Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS
LJ. 631 (1975) (stating that press freedom is distinct from freedom of speech).
20. See, eg., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (reporters, like all citizens, must respond
to valid grand jury subpoenas).
21. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). See infra notes 269-305 and accompanying text.
22. 494 U.S. at 667.
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a dissenting opinion Justice Kennedy analyzed the law solely in First
Amendment terms and claimed that the First Amendment prohibited
this distinction among speakers.2 a
Serious problems are created by framing free expression cases in equal
protection terms. As Austin illustrates, assessing a legislative distinction
in equal protection terms may yield results that conflict with First
Amendment doctrine. The more common complaint about the use of
equal protection in free expression cases is that it merely masks First
Amendment values. For example, in Carey v. Brown2 4 and Police De-
partment v. Mosley,25 in which picketing laws were invalidated because
of content-discriminatory features, the decisions tracked First Amend-
ment doctrine; the equal protection references added nothing of
substance.26
Most importantly, a perverse aspect of framing freedom of expression
cases in equal protection terms is that equal suppression may be more
important than equal liberty. That is, if equality is defined by uniform
burdens, the fact that the law reaches all similarly situated speakers may
well be dispositive. In an influential article, Professor Karst argued that
in free expression cases, the principle of equality necessarily means equal
liberty.27 To Karst, equal liberty was part of the central meaning of the
First Amendment. 2' A court reviewing a uniformly applicable law must
be concerned with the law's impact on freedom; even a uniformly appli-
cable law can impermissibly restrict First Amendment rights. Addition-
23. Id. at 712-13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
24. 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (statute prohibiting residential picketing invalid because of exemption
for labor picketing).
25. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting picketing near school invalid because of exemp-
tion for labor picketing).
26. See, eg., Carey, 447 U.S. at 471-72 (Stewart, J., concurring) (what was actually at stake in
Carey and Mosley was the basic meaning of the constitutional protection of free speech); Michael J.
Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1076
(1979) (Mosley's reliance on equal protection was gratuitous); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 561-63 (1982) (Carey is a First Amendment decision masquerad-
ing in the form of equality); Roy A. Black, Case Comment, Equal But Inadequate Protection: A Look
at Mosley and Grayned, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 469, 473 (1973) (Mosley is so laden with
elements of First Amendment analysis that it would have made sense without any mention of equal
protection).
Justice Scalia recently admitted that cases like Mosley fuse the First Amendment into the Equal
Protection Clause with the acknowledgment that the First Amendment underlies the analysis.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544 n.4 (1992).
27. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20, 21 (1975).
28. Id.
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ally, the conclusion that the government has unconstitutionally
discriminated among speakers does not necessarily determine the consti-
tutionality of a law uniformly restricting all speakers. Free expression
cases must address the substantive definition of freedom, an inquiry that
is easily avoided within the equal protection framework.
How equality is defined affects the remedy for discriminatory laws.
For example, when a legislature is found to have unconstitutionally pro-
hibited picketing on certain topics, equal suppression allows it to cure the
defect by prohibiting all picketing.29 An emphasis on equal freedom,
however, would lead to a different result. The legislature could cure con-
tent-discriminatory features by enacting a content-neutral law that uni-
formly regulates matters such as the number of pickets and the time of
picketing rather than prohibiting all picketing. This approach increases
the class of actors affected by the law, while the burden imposed upon
the class is lessened.
Thinking about the remedy to a discriminatory law also illuminates
whether the defect is the law's tailoring or its goal. If broadening the ban
on picketing to all topics is constitutional, conceivably the defect of the
law is the distinction among topics. However, if extending the ban to all
topics still leaves an impermissible restriction on First Amendment
rights, the state's interest is insufficient to justify the prohibition. The
Court's criticism of tailoring, therefore, may be a surrogate for criticism
of the goal's importance and the underlying value choices the law
represents.
29. Courts sometimes fear that eliminating differential treatment may cause even greater harm
to freedom of expression. For example, in Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), the court of appeals found that a law concerning demon-
strations near embassies was permissible even though certain demonstrations were banned because of
their content. Striking out the element of content discrimination and leaving a content-neutral prohi-
bition would broaden the statute's application, "a peculiar outcome." Id. at 1474. Cf. Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 475 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's approach be-
cause the state would fare better by adopting a more restrictive means). In dissent, Chief Judge
Wald stated that the importance of the equality principle justifies elimination of content distinctions.
Because of the dangers of viewpoint discrimination, and the core value of equality, Wald stated that
an alternative that restricts more speech, but preserves equality, is less restrictive of First Amend-
ment freedoms. 798 F.2d at 1493 (Wald, C.J., dissenting). Wald's dissent is an example of the dan-
gers created by an emphasis on equal suppression. In addition, the majority overlooks the possibility
of a content-neutral law that is less restrictive than a total ban on picketing. The availability of a
content-neutral alternative was critical in the Supreme Court's invalidation of the law. 485 U.S. at
325-29.
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B. The Dangers of Underinclusive Laws
The concept of equal freedom provides a powerful explanation of why
one should disfavor underinclusive laws affecting freedom of expression.
However, the concept contains a significant shortcoming. One can ac-
knowledge the importance of equality while narrowly defining the class
of actors entitled to equal treatment. This may be especially significant
in cases involving new types of speakers. For example, the necessity of
treating established media alike is readily apparent, but a new medium
like cable may be regarded as distinct largely because of its newness. Jus-
tifications other than equality should also animate the First Amend-
ment's hostility to underinclusive laws. These laws can harm the self-
governing process and reflect illegitimate motivation. In addition, these
laws may chill speech and have viewpoint-discriminatory effects.
In Bellotti, the Court criticized a restriction on corporate expression
because of its impact on the public's access to information, not its effect
on the rights of speakers. Although language in Bellotti refers to a right
to receive information, the case really rests on the importance of self-
government.30 The Court stated that because citizens "are entrusted
with the responsibility for judging and evaluating" the merits of conflict-
ing arguments, laws that restrict the public's access to information harm
the process of self-government.31 Implicit in the self-governance ration-
ale is a strong presumption against government action that burdens some
speakers and skews "the stock of information from which members of
the public may draw." 32 Thus, the government is disqualified from re-
stricting the subjects that certain speakers may address.33
The fear of underinclusion also guards against the danger that the po-
litically powerless will bear the brunt of governmental burdens while the
powerful are excluded. Laws treating a segment of the media differently
from other media may reflect the relative political power of different me-
dia. For example, local newspapers are generally monopolies and have
considerable influence with state and local legislators. Other segments of
the press, such as national magazines, do not have the same influence
with state and local legislators and are thus more vulnerable to regula-
tion. This inequality in political power may explain why retail newspa-
30. William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987 Sup. CT.
REV. 303, 327-31.
31. 435 U.S. 765, 791 & n.31 (1978).
32. Id. at 783.
33. Id. at 785.
1993]
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per sales are generally exempt from sales tax in states where magazine
sales are not exempt. 4 Additionally, media institutions frequently seek
government protection from competitors. The newspaper industry's
campaign to have Congress prevent telephone company entry into elec-
tronic publishing is perhaps the best known contemporary example.35 In
their classic article on equal protection, Tussman and tenBroek argue
that legislative submission to political pressure does not constitute a fair
reason to exclude the politically powerful from legislation affecting the
less powerful but similarly situated for the purpose of the law.36
It is possible to infer from underinclusive laws that the legislature se-
lected the burdened class in order to harm that class. The flip side of this
in freedom of expression cases is that the legislature may have selected
the favored class in order to chill the speech of the members of that class.
Central to the decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue 37 is the Court's belief that when the press re-
ceives favored treatment, the legislature can then threaten the press with
the possibility of more burdensome treatment. 38 This "threat can oper-
ate as effectively as a censor to check critical comment by the press, un-
dercutting the basic assumption of our political system that the press will
often serve as an important restraint on government. '39
Differential treatment of communicators based upon subject matter, as
in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,'° is unconstitutional. The
underlying apprehension is that the government's action skews the mar-
34. Brief Amicus Curiae of Dow Jones & Company, Inc. at 6-7, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S.
Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38). See infra note 214.
35. For a discussion of this and other instances of newspaper publishers seeking to use the
government to restrain competition, see PHILLIP D. MINK, NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS & FREEDOM
OF SPEECH: USING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROTECT NEWSPAPERS FROM COMPETITION
(1989). Of course, many other communicators have sought government protection from competitors.
For example, a consistent theme in the history of election law is the effort of groups to gain advan-
tage over rivals. John R. Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Polit-
ical Speech, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 373, 411 (1980).
36. Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 350 (1949). See also Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow [government] officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they apply legislation").
37. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). See infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
38. 460 U.S. at 588.
39. Id. at 585. The Court believed that differential treatment of the press suggests that the goal
of the regulation is related to suppression of expression. Id.
40. 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (law exempting religious, professional, trade, and sports magazines
from sales tax found unconstitutional). See infra notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
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ketplace of ideas.41 But facially-neutral laws that differentiate among
communicators may also harm the marketplace. By granting a certain
segment of the press preferential treatment, the government may be seek-
ing to enhance the presentation of particular ideas or subjects. Con-
versely, the government's action may also have the effect of retarding the
presentation of some ideas and subjects. For example, a law taxing cable
subscriptions but exempting newspaper sales may have the effect of
favoring certain ideas or subjects that are associated with newspapers and
disfavoring ideas associated with cable. Great difficulties exist in discov-
ering the disparate impact of a facially content-neutral law. Courts are
poorly equipped to evaluate media content to determine if particular
ideas and viewpoints are associated with a particular medium of
communication.
A solution to this problem is the adoption of a prophylactic rule re-
quiring uniform treatment of similarly situated segments of the press, as
well as uniform treatment of press and nonpress entities. This was the
thrust of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Minneapolis Star. Others have
voiced similar views. For example, Professor Ely argues for a prophylac-
tic rule because "First Amendment freedoms are so peculiarly delicate,
and the possibility of discrimination against certain ideas without effec-
tive judicial review is so evident, that taxes imposed in a First Amend-
ment area must be universal and uniform."'4
Given the dangers posed by underinclusive laws, why is any misfit be-
tween the means and the end allowed? The Court has a variable stan-
dard. Sometimes no amount of misfit is allowed, yet other times no
amount of misfit is too much. Sometimes a plausible reason for exclu-
sions is necessary. Other times only a compelling reason will suffice.
And sometimes the Court is deferential in its scrutiny of the state's inter-
est. Yet, as the recent decision in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York
State Crime Victims Board43 illustrates, the Court occassionally disagrees
41. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988) ("a law...
permitting communication in a certain manner for some but not for others raises the specter of
content and viewpoint censorship."). See generally Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and
the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1991).
42. John H. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1330 (1970).
43. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). In Simon & Schuster, New York required that proceeds from the
sale of a criminal's story be used to compensate the criminal's victims. New York argued that its
interest was to compensate victims out of the proceeds of the sale of stories of their victimization.
The Court, however, found that this merely posited the effect of the statute as the state's interest. "If
accepted, this sort of circular defense can sidestep judicial review of almost any statute, because it
1993]
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with the definition of the state's interest and concludes that the law is
improperly tailored. To understand the variable standard, the Article
will discuss cases in which the Court addressed possible misfit.
1. Underinclusion as a Violation of the First Amendment
In cases in which the Court finds that a law affecting freedom of ex-
pression is underinclusive, the misfit undermines the validity of the
state's interest,44 does not sufficiently promote the interest,45 or presents
the danger of suppression of ideas.4" Four cases, First National Bank v.
Bellotti,47 Florida Star v. B.JF ,48 R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,49 and City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc.5" illustrate the Court's treatment of
this type of law.
At issue in Bellotti was a Massachusetts law prohibiting certain ex-
penditures by business corporations for the purpose of influencing the
vote on referenda, except those materially affecting the property or assets
of the corporation. Referenda concerning the taxation of the income,
makes all statutes look narrowly tailored." Id. at 510. The Court agreed that compensation of crime
victims was a compelling interest, but found no legitimate reason to define the interest in compensa-
tion solely in terms of profits from storytelling.
44. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 396 (1984) (the underinclusiveness of a
ban on public broadcast station editorials undermines the substantiality of an interest in preventing
private groups from propagating their views via public broadcasting); Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 79 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (the underinclusiveness of a ban on live
entertainment undermines any argument about the need to maintain the residential nature of the
community); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978) (the underinclusiveness of a ban
on corporate referenda expenditures "undermines the likelihood of a genuine state interest in pro-
tecting shareholders"). Cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (residential picketing statute
violates the Fourteenth Amendment because its underinclusiveness fatally impeaches the state's
claim that it is concerned with maintaining domestic tranquility).
45. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989) (law prohibiting mass media disclo-
sure of the identity of a rape victim, but allowing disclosure by other means that may be as harmful,
does not satisfactorily serve the interest in privacy); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481
U.S. 221, 232 (1987) (interest in encouraging fledgling publications is not served by content-based
approach to taxation of magazines); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979)
(statute punishing newspaper disclosure of the identity of a juvenile offender, but allowing broadcast
disclosure, does not accomplish its stated purpose in protecting anonymity).
46. R-A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547-48 (1992) (selective prohibition of fighting
words creates the risk that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored views).
47. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
48. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
49. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
50. 61 U.S.L.W. 4272 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1993).
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property, or transactions of individuals were specified as not affecting the
property or assets of corporations.5" The appellants sought to make ex-
penditures concerning a ballot proposition allowing a graduated income
tax for individuals. The state defended the restriction as necessary to
protect corporate shareholders by preventing use of corporate resources
to express views with which some shareholders may disagree. The Court
questioned the genuineness of this interest because a particular type of
ballot question was singled out for special treatment. This suggested that
the legislature had an impermissible motivation-silencing corporations
on particular subjects.52
The law was also regarded as underinclusive because it applied only to
business corporations and not to other entities in which persons may
hold an interest or membership such as labor unions and other associa-
tions. "Minorities in such groups or entities may have interests with re-
spect to institutional speech quite comparable to those of minority
shareholders in a corporation."53 Significantly, the law did not prevent
corporations from using corporate funds to express views on issues that
were not the subject of referenda, even though shareholders might disap-
prove of those views. Finally, the law did not restrict lobbying. These
attributes undermined the plausibility of the state's purported concern
for shareholders.5" Even assuming that the interest in protecting share-
holders was compelling, the link between the interest and the prohibition
was insufficient to justify the restriction on speech.55
In his dissent, Justice White believed the Court was substituting its
judgment for that of the legislature. The legislature could permissibly
find, on the basis of experience which the Court lacks, that other activi-
ties and forms of association did not present the problems posed by cor-
porate expenditures on referenda.56
51. 435 U.S. at 768 n.2.
52. Id. at 793. The Court stated that "the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dic-
tating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public
issue." Id. at 784-85. Professor Nimmer argues that underinclusive laws restricting speech create a
conclusive presumption that the state's actual interest is content-based. NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 2.061B] at 2-94.
53. 435 U.S. at 793. For criticism of the comparison between stockholders of a corporation and
members of a union, see Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the
First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 292-94 (1981).
54. 435 U.S. at 793.
55. Id. at 795. The statute was also overinclusive because it prohibited corporate expenditures
even if shareholders unanimously authorized the expenditure. Id. at 794.
56. Id. at 816 n.13 (White, J., dissenting).
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The difference between the majority and Justice White is explained by
the majority's belief that the law seriously burdened First Amendment
rights.57 In contrast, Justice White regarded the law as only minimally
affecting freedom of expression.58 Because of this difference, the Court
was unwilling to allow any misfit; Justice White, however, believed the
Court should defer to the legislature's choice of means in an arena in
which the "expertise of legislators" is at its peak.59
In Florida Star the Court overturned a verdict in favor of a rape victim
whose identity was disclosed by a newspaper. Because of a Florida stat-
ute punishing disclosure of a rape victim's name in "any instrument of
mass communication," the trial court found the newspaper was per se
negligent. The Supreme Court drew upon Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co.," concluding that publication of lawfully obtained information
about a matter of public concern can be punished only when the state is
furthering an interest of the highest order.6 Although the Court ac-
knowledged that the interests in protecting victims' privacy, protecting
victims from retaliation by their assailants, and encouraging victims to
report their crimes were highly significant,62 it concluded that the pub-
lisher should not be punished.
One of the grounds relied upon by the Court was the law's underinclu-
siveness. The law prohibited publication of identifying information only
if it appeared in an instrument of mass communication; other methods of
communication that would be as harmful to the interests were permitted.
"An individual who maliciously spreads word of the identity of a rape
victim is thus not covered, despite the fact that the communication of
such information to persons who live near, or work with, the victim may
have consequences as devastating as the exposure of her name to large
57. The Court regarded the speech in question as indispensable to the democratic process, 435
U.S. at 777. Because the people are responsible for judging arguments concerning government pol-
icy, the government is forbidden from restricting access to expression "lest the people lose their
ability to govern themselves." Id. at 791 n.31.
58. Justice White believed that corporate expression was entitled to less protection than expres-
sion which contributes to self-realization. Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting). Further, the law did not
prevent corporate officials from publicizing their views at their own expense. Id. at 808-09. To Jus-
tice White, the law had the effect of merely curtailing the volume of expression. Id. at 821.
59. Id. at 804.
60. 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (law punishing disclosure of identity of juvenile offender).
61. 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989).
62. Id. at 537.
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numbers of strangers."6 Due to the importance of the First Amendment
interests at stake, the Court was unwilling to allow the state to claim that
partial prohibition at least created partial relief. The state must demon-
strate its commitment to advancing the privacy interest by applying its
prohibition evenhandedly "to the smalltime disseminator as well as the
media giant."" Without more inclusive precautions against alternative
forms of dissemination, the Court was unwilling to regard the selective
ban on publication by the mass media as satisfactorily serving the as-
serted interests.65
Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion argued that it was sufficient to
decide this case solely on the grounds of underinclusivity. A law cannot
be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order if it leaves ap-
preciable means of damage to that interest unprohibited. 66 Like the ma-
jority, Justice Scalia believed that oral disclosure of a victim's identity
among friends would cause as much discomfort as mass publication.67
Justice Scalia concluded, "This law has every appearance of a prohibition
that society is prepared to impose upon the press but not upon itself.
Such a prohibition does not protect an interest 'of the highest order.' "68
In his dissent, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor, argued that the majority's reliance on Daily Mail was
misplaced, because those who are victims of crimes have privacy interests
"infinitely more substantial" than the privacy interests of those accused
of crimes. 69 In Justice White's view, this case required greater sensitivity
to the privacy interest. Consequently, he attached less significance to the
interest in press freedom than the majority.7" On the issue of underinclu-
siveness, Justice White claimed that other press cases involving underin-
elusiveness have involved circumstances in which a legislature singled
out one segment of the news media for adverse treatment71 or singled out
the press for adverse treatment in comparison to other similarly situated
enterprises.72 The Florida law evenhandedly covered all forms of mass
63. Id. at 540. Justice White, though, believed that Florida tort law would reach the neighbor-
hood gossip. See infra text accompanying note 74.
64. 491 U.S. at 540.
65. Id. at 540-41.
66. Id. at 541-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 542.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 551-53.
71. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
72. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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communication. The law could exclude neighborhood gossips "because
presumably the Florida Legislature has determined that neighborhood
gossips do not pose the danger and intrusion to rape victims" that mass
communication poses.7 3 Justice White also claimed that the majority's
analysis was misguided because it focused solely on the rape victim stat-
ute and did not acknowledge that other aspects of Florida law, such as
the general privacy tort, could reach the neighborhood gossip.74
The difference between the majority and the dissent is explained by the
importance each attached to the competing rights of press freedom and
privacy. To the majority, punishing publication of truthful information
was an "extraordinary measure, ' 75 especially because the information
concerned a matter of paramount public importance.76 Moreover, if the
press were liable for publication of information lawfully obtained from
the government, the Court believed the press would engage in self-cen-
sorship.77 Justice White's dissent, however, treated the newspaper's be-
havior as irresponsible78 and causing great harm to the rape victim. 79
Any significant interest in reporting the victim's identity was outweighed
by the invasion of privacy. If the First Amendment protected publica-
tion of this victim's name, Justice White believed the tort of public dis-
closure of private facts was obliterated. 80
Despite its rhetoric, one should not read Florida Star as though reme-
dial action by the legislature to broaden the law would make it constitu-
tional. Including the neighborhood gossip within the law's reach would
leave intact the law's serious impact on publication of newsworthy infor-
mation. While the Court's language appears to leave open this corrective
action by the legislature, the Court's criticism of the means may be a
surrogate for criticism of the law's result. Likewise, the defects of the
law in Bellotti would not be cured by expanding the ban to unions and
other associations. In these settings, the preferred result under the First
73. 491 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 549-50. Justice Scalia, though, did not believe that it was clear that Florida's general
privacy law would reach the neighborhood gossip. Id. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
75. 491 U.S. at 540.
76. Id. at 537.
77. Id. at 535, 538.
78. Id. at 547 & n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that it is not too much to ask the press in
instances such as this to respect simple standards of decency).
79. Id. at 542-43.
80. Id. at 551-53.
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Amendment is for all communicators to enjoy equal freedom to
communicate.
There are settings, though, such as in R.A. V, in which the defect of a
law is cured by increasing its breadth. In that case the city sought to
defend its selective fighting words ordinance as a means of insuring the
basic human rights of members of groups that have been historically sub-
ject to discrimination."1 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court found this
compelling interest was promoted by the law.82 However, because fight-
ing words were properly regulated as an impermissible mode of speech,
like a noisy sound truck, their regulation could not be based on the un-
derlying message.8 3 The law failed the dispositive test of whether the
content discrimination was necessary because the "only interest distinc-
tively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the city coun-
cil's special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out."84
Justice Scalia concluded that a fighting words ordinance not limited to
the favored topics would serve the interest and eliminate the danger of
viewpoint discrimination.85
In his concurring opinion, Justice White found the law overbroad be-
cause it reached protected expression that caused hurt feelings or resent-
ment. 6 He strongly disagreed with the Court's treatment of the content
distinction. 7 Drawing on Burson v. Freeman,"8 decided a month before
81. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2545.
84. Id. at 2550.
85. Id.
86. 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring). He was joined in this part of his opinion by
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor.
87. Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, felt that within a category of
proscribable expression, the government may treat subsets differently without violating the First
Amendment. Id. at 2553. The distinction between the Court and Justice White is buttressed by the
different manner in which they viewed fighting words. Justice White believed that fighting words are
not a means of exchanging views. Rather, fighting words are a means of provoking violence. Conse-
quently, a ban on fighting words or a subset would not drive ideas from the marketplace. Id. The
Court argued that categories of proscribable speech are not "invisible" to the Constitution; they may
be regulated only on the basis of their distinctively proscribable content. 112 S. Ct. at 2543. Because
fighting words were sometimes "quite expressive" of ideas, their treatment must be viewpoint neu-
tral. Id. at 2544.
Justice Stevens disagreed with the analysis of both the Court and Justice White and proposed "a
more complex and subtle analysis, one that considers the content and context of the regulated
speech, and the nature and scope of the restriction on speech." Id. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring).
88. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (law prohibiting political speech near polling places found constitu-
tional). See infra text accompanying notes 154-69.
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R.A. V, Justice White claimed that content distinctions are justified when
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The St. Paul law was
justifiable because the reasons for prohibiting fighting words have special
force when applied to groups that have "long been the targets of discrim-
ination." 9 If the city broadened the law, it would create a more restric-
tive alternative, which the Court would find defective because it is not
precisely tailored to the need identified by the government. 90
Justice White stated that it was inconsistent to hold that a city could
proscribe an entire category of speech, but not selectively target a subset
of that category. 91 Justice White believed that the Court's opinion meant
that a narrowly drawn content-based law could never be valid if the ob-
ject could be accomplished by banning a wider category of speech.92
Consequently, governments were in the position of either enacting sweep-
ing bans, or not legislating at all.
In the Court's view, a legislature could make distinctions within a cat-
egory of expression under certain circumstances, such as if the basis for
the distinction consists of the very reason the entire class of speech is
proscribable.93 Other bases may exist, but the touchstone is that the law
must not suppress ideas. Save for that limitation, the regulation of fight-
ing words, like the regulation of noisy speech, may address some offen-
sive instances and leave other, equally offensive instances alone. 94 Justice
White predicted these exceptions would confuse lower courts, and Justice
Stevens called them ill-defined.95
The Court framed its decision in terms of content discrimination and
expressly disclaimed any concern for underbreadth. The Court stated
that legislatures could selectively regulate proscribable speech in a view-
point-neutral manner. For example, legislatures could proscribe obscen-
ity only in certain media and markets.96 The Court was signalling that it
was not questioning every regulation of proscribable speech, but its com-
89. 112 S. Ct. at 2557 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also found this to be reasonable.
Id. at 2565 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 2554 n.5 (White, J., concurring)
91. Id. at 2553.
92. Id. at 2554.
93. 112 S. Ct. at 2545. Another basis for differential treatment of a subclass of proscribable
speech is that the subclass is associated with particular secondary effects. Id. at 2546.
94. Id. at 2547.
95. Id. at 2560 (White, 3., concurring), id. at 2562 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
[Vol. 71:637
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/4
DOCTRINE OF UNDERBREADTH
ment provokes more questions than answers.97
One should not read the Court's willingness to tolerate viewpoint-neu-
tral underinclusive regulations in the area of proscribable speech as nec-
essarily applying to protected expression.98 As noted previously,
although one can view the selectivity of a law as an attribute because the
government has limited the reach of the law, one can also view it as a
defect that undermines the legitimacy of the state's interest. Perhaps jus-
tifications for the selective regulation of protected expression exist, but
careful exploration of the justifications opens a dialogue on the advisabil-
ity of: (1) broadening the class of actors affected by the prohibition; (2)
broadening the class but lessening the law's burden; or (3) eliminating
the law altogether.
Although the R.A. V Court expressed a willingness to tolerate view-
point-neutral underinclusive restrictions of proscribable speech, the sub-
sequent Discovery Network case indicates the Court's animosity toward
such restrictions of protected expression. The case involved a challenge
to Cincinnati's decision to promote aesthetics and public safety by pro-
scribing newsracks containing commercial publications, while allowing
newsracks containing newspapers. The distinction was based on
Supreme Court statements that commercial speech is less protected than
other expression.99 Cincinnati believed that treating the categories of ex-
pression alike would lower the protection of noncommercial expres-
sion."° Only sixty-two commercial dispensing devices were affected,
which left betweeen 1,500-2,000 newsracks on city streets.
One of the troubling aspects of Cincinnati's regulatory scheme was
97. As Justice Stevens observed, the Court "does not tell us whether... fighting words such as
cross-burning could be proscribed only in certain neighborhoods where the threat of violence is
particularly severe .... Id. at 2562 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. Similarly, Justice White's criticism of "underbreadth" may also apply to the context of
proscribable speech. Id. at 2553.
99. See, eg., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (the Court has afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection "commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values"). Justice Blackmun, who claimed that the Court's "chickens
have come home to roost" in the Discovery Network case, found that Cincinnati's reading of the
Court's commercial speech cases was understandable. Nonetheless, he argued that the status of com-
mercial speech was not based on its lesser value to consumers, but on the need to protect consumers
from deception and other such harms. 61 U.S.L.W. 4272, 4278 & n.2 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1993) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
100. See Brief for Petitioner at 28 (providing newsracks with commercial publications the same
treatment as newsracks with noncommercial publications would violate the First Amendment pro-
tection of noncommercial speech). City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 4272
(U.S. Mar. 24, 1993) (No. 91-1200).
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that the city had no precise definitions of newspapers and commercial
publications.101 Both newspapers and respondents' publications featured
core commercial speech as well as noncommercial speech. The difference
between the publications was simply a matter of degree.102 The lack of
clear definitions presented the potential for "invidious discrimination of
disfavored subjects," 103 a condition found unacceptable in a previous
newsrack case, City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.1" The
Discovery Network Court set this concern aside, and assumed for the pur-
pose of deciding the case that the respondents' publications contained
only "core" commercial speech and newspapers contained no such
speech. 105 Thus, the issue in the case was whether the "low value" of
commercial speech was sufficient justification for the selective ban on
newsracks.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Souter, found that the city attaches "more importance to the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech than our
cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial
speech."10' 6 Commercial speech, the Court noted, may be of more value
to the audience than political discourse.10 7 Therefore, any distinction
drawn between newsracks must be related to the city's interests in safety
and aesthetics. In this case, however, the distinction bore no relationship
to the asserted interests.
The Court believed that all newsracks, regardless of content, were
equally threatening to the asserted interests. For example, the Court
stated that respondents' newsracks "are no greater an eyesore than the
newsracks permitted to remain on Cincinnati's sidewalks. Each new-
101. Newspapers were defined as publications that are published daily or weekly and primarily
present coverage of current events. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4274. Commercial publications were those
printed materials that advertise the sale of goods or services. Id. at 4272 n.2. The Court noted that
newspapers include core commercial speech, and conversely the respondents' publications included
some noncommercial speech. Id. at 4275. "Presumably, respondents' publications do not qualify as
newspapers because an examination of their content discloses a higher ratio of advertising to other
text, such as news and feature stories, than is found in the exempted publications." Id. at 4274
(footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 4275.
103. Id. at n.19.
104. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
105. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4275.
106. Id. at 4274.
107. Id. at 4275 n.17 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)). See also
id. at 4276 n.21 (the interest in protecting the free flow of information is still present when such
expression is found in a commercial context).
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srack, whether containing 'newspapers' or 'commercial handbills' is
equally unattractive." ' The city's interests were not tied to distinctive
effects of commercial content.10 9 Furthermore, no secondary effects at-
tributable to the newsracks existed that distinguished them from the per-
missible newsracks. 1° The Court concluded, "In the absence of some
basis for distinguishing between 'newspapers' and 'commercial handbills'
that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city, we are unwilling to
recognize Cincinnati's bare assertion that the 'low value' of commercial
speech is a sufficient justification for its selective and categorical ban on
newsracks dispensing 'commercial handbills.'""
Due to Chief Justice Rehnquist's oft-stated animosity to First Amend-
ment protection of commercial speech, 12 his dissent was not surprising.
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented because he believed commercial speech
had low value. Moreover, he claimed Cincinnati's action was consistent
with the Court's commercial speech precedents.113 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist claimed the Court has never suggested that commercial speech can
be favored over noncommercial speech, "but before today we have never
even suggested that the converse holds true." '114
The differing views of the majority and the dissent on the status of
commercial speech explains their approaches to underinclusivity. The
majority believed that commercial speech should be freely available to
consumers who may value it highly." 5 Although commercial speech
presents peculiar dangers, such as deception and coercion that are appro-
priately subject to regulation, these dangers have "little, if any applica-
tion to a regulation" of the distribution practices of commercial
publications. 1 6 Consequently, the Court closely examined the fit of the
law and concluded that its benefits were paltry because it did not reach
the vast majority of noncommercial newspaper racks that were equally
108. Id. at 4276. The Court added that in terms of aggregate impact, newspapers were "argua-
bly the greater culprit because of their superior number." Id.
109. Id. & n.21.
110. Id. at 4277.
111. Id. at 4276.
112. See, e.g., his dissent in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 790 (1976).
113. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4279-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by
Justices White and Thomas.
114. Id. at 4281.
115. See supra note 107.
116. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4276 n.21.
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responsible for safety and esthetic problems." 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist
believed it was appropriate to place the burden entirely on commercial
speech because such speech is less central to the concerns of the First
Amendment than noncommercial speech. He claimed that every news-
rack removed from the sidewalks marginally served the asserted interests
and the government need not completely fulfill its objectives. 18 Because
the city had burdened less speech than necessary to achieve its goal, the
underinclusivity was not fatal.
Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that treating commercial speech like
noncommercial speech would force cities to choose between either
prohibiting more speech or allowing "the proliferation of newsracks on
its street corners to continue unabated."'1 19 But as the majority noted, it
is possible to regulate the size, shape, appearance, or number of all
newracks. 120 This regulation would not level the protection of noncom-
mercial expression because it does not completely ban newsracks. The
Court found the availability of an obvious and less-burdensome alterna-
tive to the restriction of commercial speech was a relevant consideration
in determining whether the fit of a law was reasonable.121
Two important questions, which are not directly answered in this case,
bear on the general problem of underinclusive laws. First, the Court did
not directly answer whether a complete prohibition on all newsracks
would be constitutional. It assumed, arguendo, that a city might prohibit
newsracks on public property. However, the Court noted that it granted
certiorari in part because of the importance of newsracks as a means of
disseminating speech. 122 More importantly, though, the importance the
Court placed on the option of broadening the class affected by the law
(all newsracks), but adopting measures less burdensome than a prohibi-
tion, indicates a complete prohibition would not be favored. Also, the
tone of the majority opinion reflects the importance of equal freedom,
rather than the concept of equal suppression. Second, the Court did not
directly answer whether commercial speech must be treated like fully
protected categories of speech if the regulation is not directed at content
117. Id. at 4274 & 4276.
118. Id. at 4280 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
119. Id. at 4281. Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that a city could order removal of all news-
racks from its rights-of-way. Id. But see Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189,
1196-97 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (citation of cases finding a complete ban on newsracks unconstitutional).
120. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4273.
121. Id. at 4274 n.13.
122. Id. at 4273 & n.10.
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or specific adverse effects stemming from the content. 123 However, the
Court's emphasis on how commercial and noncommercial publications
were "equally" responsible for the problems of concern to the city124 il-
lustrates that distinct treatment of commercial and noncommercial
speech must be justified by characteristics relevant to the law's
purpose. 125
2. Permissible Laws that Selectively Target Sources of a Problem
In certain First Amendment settings the Court finds that legislators
may approach problems one step at a time, 126 or that targeting only a few
sources of a problem does not undermine the justification for a law.127
The Court also finds that the government should not be faulted for limit-
ing the reach of a law, 128 and even that underinclusion is more appropri-
ately addressed in equal protection challenges.' 29  Two cases, City
123. Id. at n.1 1. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that truthful, noncoercive
commercial speech concerning lawful activities was entitled to full First Amendment protection. Id.
at 4279 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4276.
125. The cases cited as support for the Court's proposition that distinctions must be related to
the asserted interests involved restrictions on noncommercial speech. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 510 (1991) (distinction drawn by Son of Sam law
between income derived from criminal's description of his crime and other sources has nothing to do
with the state's interest in transferring the proceeds of crime from criminals to their victims); Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (state's interest in residential privacy cannot sustain a distinction
between permissible labor picketing and prohibited nonlabor picketing).
126. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 n.11 (1986) (noting that
while corporations are not the only type of entities that might divert resources for political purposes,
Congress can approach the problem step by step).
127. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665 (1990) (excluding unincor-
porated unions from a ban on political expenditures does not undermine the state's justification for
regulating corporations).
128. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733-34 (1990) (postal service policy of allowing
some speech activities but banning solicitation at post offices testifies of its willingness to provide as
broad a forum as possible). Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 n.5 (1973) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to law restricting the political activities of some government employees
and stating that the government cannot be faulted for attempting to limit the reach of the law).
129. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733-34. For examples of cases in which lower courts rejected a First
Amendment challenge based on underinclusiveness, see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916
F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Son of Sam" law designed to compensate victims of crimes is adequately
tailored), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (content-
based law prohibiting certain demonstrations found to be adequately tailored), rev'd sub nom. Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Movie & Video World, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 723 F.
Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (government may classify adult oriented businesses differently than other
establishments); Authors League of America, Inc. v. Association of American Publishers, 619 F.
Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Congress can create restrictions under the Copyright Act that apply to
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Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent 130 and City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres 131 illustrate the Court's deferential treatment of content-neutral laws
that do not address all sources of a problem. Burson v. Freeman,"2 a
rare instance of the Court sustaining a content-based restriction of polit-
ical speech, is also discussed.
Vincent involved a municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of
signs on public property. The Court concluded the law was content neu-
tral and the property was not a public forum. 33 The Court rejected the
argument that the city's aesthetic interest was compromised because
equally unattractive signs were allowed on private property. Based upon
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,134 in which a law permitted on-
site billboards but banned off-site billboards, the Court concluded that
countervailing interests can outweigh aesthetic interests in certain set-
tings. The interest of the private citizen in controlling use of his property
justified the disparate treatment, as did the fact that the posting of signs
on private property left open a significant means of communication.135
Even if some blight resulted, the aesthetic interest was sufficiently ad-
vanced by prohibiting signs on public property. 36
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and Black-
mun, feared that aesthetics can be a facade for content discrimination., 37
Justice Brennan found that aesthetic objectives should be accepted as
substantial and unrelated to suppression of expression only if the govern-
ment demonstrates that it is comprehensively pursuing its objective. 3 8
This approach guards against the danger of content discrimination, indi-
cates the government's commitment to achieving its objective, and facili-
some materials, but not all, without violating the First Amendment), afd sub nom. Authors League
of America, Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (1986).
130. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
131. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
132. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
133. 466 U.S. at 804, 813-15.
134. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In Metromedia the Court concluded that despite "the apparent ineon-
graity," a city could allow equally distracting and unattractive billboards at on-site locations, but
prohibit them off-site. Id. at 511-12.
135. 466 U.S. at 811.
136. Id. at 811-12.
137. Id. at 823-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan believed that particular media may
be used disproportionately for particular messages and a facially-neutral restriction may be content-
discriminatory. Id. at 823 n.5.
138. Id. at 828.
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tates judicial review of the fit between the ends and means.1 39 Justice
Brennan's approach did not mean that all aesthetic problems must be
addressed at one time. Rather, he required that laws promoting aesthet-
ics target both expressive and nonexpressive activities. Also, these laws
may not arbitrarily prohibit a form of speech with the same aesthetic
characteristics as those forms of speech that are allowed.' 4°
To the majority, the posting of signs on public property was not a
uniquely valuable or important mode of communication.1 41 Justice
Brennan, however, regarded the posting of signs as a "time-honored"
means of communication of critical importance to " 'the poorly financed
causes of little people.' "142 While the majority assumed that alternative
means of communication were adequate, 143 Justice Brennan examined
the alternatives and found that they were inadequate. 144 Consequently,
he believed that the government's justifications must be examined with
exacting scrutiny.
In Renton, the Court addressed a zoning ordinance affecting the loca-
tion of adult movie theaters. The Court concluded that the ordinance
was content neutral because it was aimed at secondary effects, such as
crime, associated with adult movie theaters. 145 It was permissible to
treat adult theaters differently from theaters showing other types of films
because the secondary effects were associated only with adult theaters. 146
However, the respondents contended that the ordinance was underinclu-
sive because it did not affect other adult businesses likely to produce sec-
ondary effects similar to those associated with theaters. The Court
rejected this claim on the ground that when the ordinance was adopted
there were no other types of adult businesses located in or planning to
locate in the city. "That Renton chose first to address the potential
problems created by one particular kind of adult business in no way sug-
gests that the city has 'singled out' adult theaters for discriminatory
139. Id. He found the fit between the means and the ends particularly difficult to measure in
cases in which the government claimed an interest in aesthetics. Id. at 824-26.
140. Id. at 829.
141. 466 U.S. at 812.
142. Id. at 819-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
146 (1943)).
143. 466 U.S. at 812.
144. Id. at 820-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986).
146. Id. at 52. Thus, the ordinance was narrowly tailored because it only targeted theaters which
had adverse secondary effects on the community.
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treatment." 147
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, regarded
the ordinance as underinclusive and consequently content discrimina-
tory. The selective treatment of adult movie theaters "strongly suggests
that Renton was interested not in controlling the 'secondary effects' asso-
ciated with adult businesses, but in discriminating against adult theaters
based on the content of the films they exhibit."1 48 A presumption of
statutory validity should not apply if classifications turn on content, and
in this case no justification existed for treating adult theaters differently
from other adult establishments.149 Additionally, because at the time of
the ordinance's adoption no adult movie theaters were located in or plan-
ning to locate in the city, no legitimate reason for the city to limit its
ordinance to movie theaters existed. 50
The majority treated the burden on expression as slight because it
merely affected the location of adult theaters. Also, the social interest in
protecting this type of expression was diminished."15 Consequently, the
Court adopted an exceptionally deferential approach, concluding that the
city did not have to conduct its own studies of the secondary effects asso-
ciated with adult theaters, but could rely upon whatever evidence the city
believed was relevant.152 Justice Brennan believed the ordinance seri-
ously restricted access to constitutionally protected expression. Closely
examining the record, Justice Brennan concluded that the city's concern
for secondary effects emerged only after the ordinance's adoption. Any
"findings" concerning the secondary effects of adult theaters were specu-
lative at best. 153
147. Id. at 52-53. The Court found no reason to believe that the city would not amend its
ordinance to include other kinds of adult businesses. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 488-89 (1955) (legislatures may approach problems one step at a time).
148. 475 U.S. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also found that many of the rea-
sons for the ordinance were nothing more than expressions of dislike for the content of adult films.
Id. at 59.
149. Id. at 58. While the Court concluded that the ordinance did not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint, 475 U.S. at 48-49, Justice Brennan observed that this subject matter restriction had a
viewpoint-differential impact; adult films carry a different message about sexual morality than other
categories of films. Id. at 56 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 58 n.2.
151. 475 U.S. at 49 n.2.
152. Id. at 51-52 ("The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting [a zoning]
ordinance [affecting adult theaters], to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities.").
153. Id. at 58-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court's approach largely immunizes such measures
from judicial scrutiny, because a municipality can readily find other ordinances to rely upon).
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At issue in Burson was a Tennessee statute prohibiting the solicitation
of votes and the distribution or display of campaign materials within 100
feet of the entrance to a polling place. Due to the statute's content-based
regulation of political speech in a public forum, the Court required that it
narrowly advance a compelling interest.154 The Court found the law pro-
moted two compelling interests, the right to vote freely, and the integrity
and reliability of elections.' The necessity of the law was demonstrated
by the history of election reform; for nearly a century states have pro-
vided a secret ballot and a restricted zone around the voting booth.156
Due to the compelling interest in securing the right to vote freely, it
was unnecessary for the state to submit empirical proof of the law's bene-
ficial effects.I5 7 When the exercise of First Amendment rights interferes
with the act of voting, and the burden on free expression is slight, legisla-
tures may "respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with
foresight rather than reactively .. ".."158 Also, because the law repre-
sented a minor geographic limitation on speech, it was sufficiently tai-
lored even though the boundary could have been less than 100 feet. 59
The respondents claimed that the law was underinclusive because
other types of speech were allowed within the zone. The Court did not
agree that the failure to regulate all speech rendered the statute fatally
underinclusive. Ample evidence proved that candidates used campaign
workers to intimidate voters and commit electoral fraud; no evidence in-
dicated that other types of speech, such as charitable solicitation, harmed
the electoral process. The Court stated, "States adopt laws to address
the problems that confront them. The First Amendment does not re-
quire States to regulate for problems that do not exist." 16°
In his dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter,
called the Court's scrutiny "toothless." 161 The plurality's reliance on
154. 112 S. Ct. at 1850-51.
155. Id. at 1851.
156. Id. at 1855.
157. Id. at 1856. The Court stated, "Elections vary from year to year, and place to place. It is
therefore difficult to make specific findings about the effects of a voting regulation. Moreover, the
remedy for a tainted election is an imperfect one. Rerunning an election would have a negative
impact on voter turnout." Id. at 1856-57.
158. Id. at 1857 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1986)).
159. 112 S. Ct. at 1857. The Court concluded that some zone was necessary, id. at 1856, and at
a certain distance government regulation of vote solicitation would be impermissible, but the Tennes-
see law was on the constitutional side of the line. Id. at 1857.
160. Id. at 1856.
161. Id. at 1866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
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history confused history with necessity, and mistook the traditional for
the indispensable.16 2 Whatever the original historical basis for cam-
paign-free zones, their continued necessity was not established, especially
because elections today are far less corrupt than in the past.1 63 Also, use
of the secret ballot and heightened regulation of the polling place meant
that controlling speech outside the polling place was unnecessary. 164
On the selectivity of the law, the dissenters criticized the plurality's
belief that there was no proof that activities like charitable solicitation
posed the same dangers as campaigning. "This analysis contradicts a
core premise of strict scrutiny-namely, that the heavy burden of justifi-
cation is on the State. The plurality has effectively shifted the burden of
proving the necessity of content discrimination from the State to the
plaintiff." 165 Nor was the content discrimination necessary to further the
state's interests. Many other nonpolitical speech activities, such as reli-
gious speech, would be just as threatening to order around the polls as
political expression. The discriminatory features of the law severely un-
dercut the credibility of the law's justification. 166
Despite its rhetoric about exacting scrutiny, the plurality was generous
to the state, largely because the burden on expression was viewed as
slight and justifiable as a means of protecting "one of the most funda-
mental and cherished liberties,"' 167 the right to vote.' 68 The dissenters
perceived the need to prevent campaigning within the polling place, but
regarded the law as silencing a significant amount of protected expres-
sion.169 Moreover, speech outside the polling place is especially impor-
tant to certain groups of candidates, such as the poorly funded, who lack
the resources to use other means of communication. 70
One should not read Justice Stevens' dissent in Burson as advocating
that the law be broadened to change the campaign-free zone to a speech-
free zone. Rather, the underlying premise is that all speakers, regardless
of subject matter, should have access to the area outside a polling place.
Justice Stevens stated, "Although we often pay homage to the electoral
162. Id. at 1862.
163. 112S. Ct. at 1863.
164. Id. at 1862. The evidence supported a need for restrictions inside the polling place. Id.
165. Id. at 1866.
166. Id. at 1864.
167. Id. at 1859 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. 112 S. Ct. at 1857.
169. Id. at 1866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1864.
[Vol. 71:637
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/4
DOCTRINE OF UNDERBREADTH
process, we must be careful not to confuse sanctity with silence." '171 Jus-
tice Brennan in his dissenting opinions in Vincent and Renton stated that
targeting only certain expressive activities raised the danger of content
discrimination. Broadening those laws to include nonexpressive activi-
ties would presumably lessen that danger. But precision of regulation is
multi-factored; broadening the class affected by a law does not address
the separate question whether the burden on that class could be lessened.
Read together, Bellotti, Florida Star, R.A. V, Discovery Network, Vin-
cent, Renton, and Burson reveal two central concerns that determine
whether the Court defers to the judgment of lawmakers on a law's selec-
tivity: the burden a law imposes on freedom of expression, and viewpoint
neutrality. If a law only slightly affects speech and is viewpoint neutral,
the Court is most likely to defer to a legislature. But these concerns can
also operate independently of one another, as R.A. V and Discovery Net-
work indicate. Even though the "hate speech" law in R.A. V had no
impact on protected speech, it was illegitimately based on the viewpoints
of proscribable expression. In Discovery Network, although the law was
viewpoint neutral, it created an impermissible burden on a category of
protected expression. Part II addresses whether the central concerns of
viewpoint discrimination and a law's burden on speech fully explain the
Court's analysis of laws providing differential treatment of the press.
II. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE PRESS
The distinct treatment of the broadcasting and print media is generally
justified by broadcaster use of the electromagnetic spectrum. This Arti-
cle does not address that well-worn topic. Instead, the focus here is those
instances in which a segment of the press is treated differently from other
members of the press even though there are no relevant distinguishing
characteristics. Although each of these cases involves taxation, general
principles emerge which forcefully apply in other settings.
A. Grosjean
In 1934 Louisiana enacted a two percent gross receipts tax on the sale
of advertising in newspapers and magazines with a circulation of more
than 20,000 copies per week. The larger daily newspapers in the state
were opposed to the machine politics of Huey P. Long. During legisla-
tive debates Long provided legislators with a circular stating "these big
171. Id. at 1866.
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Louisiana newspapers tell a lie every time they make a dollar. This tax
should be called a tax on lying, 2 cents per lie." '172 The appellees empha-
sized Long's punitive intent in their brief to the Supreme Court.1 73
The Supreme Court unanimously found the law a violation of the First
Amendment, but references to punitive intent are oblique. 174 The opin-
ion examined the historical relationship between the press and govern-
ment, emphasizing colonial taxes that were designed to prevent or curtail
the acquisition of knowledge of governmental affairs. 175 Justice Suther-
land wrote that "[a] free press stands as one of the great interpreters
between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to
fetter ourselves."
176
Although its rhethoric concerning freedom of expression marks a
striking departure from the Court's early First Amendment cases, Gros-
jean is most notable for its emphasis on the lines drawn by laws restrict-
ing First Amendment activity and the effect of such laws. In terms of
effects, the Court perceived that the tax would limit revenue and restrict
circulation, and if increased, the tax might destroy both advertising and
circulation. 177 The power to tax the press differentially was the power to
destroy the press. 178 It is important to note that the Court feared where
differential taxation might lead, rather than the modest impact of the tax
in question.
The concern for the possibility of an even more burdensome tax is tied
to the line-drawing issue. If the tax were generally applicable, the legisla-
ture would have to face more widespread discontent.1 79 The concern for
172. Appellee's Brief at 9, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (No. 35-303).
173. Id. at 26.
174. Professor Ely refers to Grosjean as a masterpiece of ambiguity. Ely, supra note 42, at 1330.
Justice O'Connor wrote that the motivation of the legislature may have been relevant to the decision
in Grosjean, but the Court has been very inconsistent in its reading of Grosjean. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 580 (1983). For contrasting readings
of Grosean, compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968) (motivation was irrele-
vant in Grosjean) with Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1978) (motivation was relevant in
Grosean).
175. There are significant questions about the accuracy of the Court's interpretation of history in
Grosjean. See CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 78 (1969).
176. 297 U.S. at 250.
177. Id. at 244-45.
178. But as Justice Holmes stated, the "power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court
sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Rehn-
quist argued the same point in Minneapolis Star. 460 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
infra text accompanying note 195.
179. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
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punitive intent would be lessened if the law were broader in its applica-
tion. Yet, this tax was suspicious because it applied only to a limited
group of newspaper publishers.I" Thus, the law was viewed as a "delib-
erate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of
information to which the public is entitled ... ."I"
Grosjean is an easy case because the class of those taxed was selected in
order to harm that class. When this occurs, the distinctions drawn can-
not stand.8 2 However, in instances where punitive purpose is less appar-
ent than in Grosjean, how are courts to determine that the lines drawn
are constitutional? Gros/ean provides a partial answer to this question
because the narrowness of the class taxed caused the Court to view the
law as unconstitutional. Because the state's interest was raising revenue,
targeting only a small group of newspapers fatally undercut the validity
of the law." 3 In any setting in which a segment of the press is treated
differently from another segment, a court should conclude that a distinc-
tion not relevant to a law's purpose is unconstitutional.
B. Minneapolis Star
Minneapolis Star Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Reve-
nue 184 presented the Court with a Minnesota law exempting newspapers
from sales tax; use of paper and ink to produce publications, however,
was taxed. Because the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper used by a
newspaper was exempt, the tax fell hardest on large newspapers. The
Star & Tribune Company claimed that the law was a tax on knowledge in
violation of Grosjean. The newspapers claimed that the state may not tax
concurring) (there is no more effective guarantee against arbitrary government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally).
180. 297 U.S. at 251. In addition to targeting newspapers opposed to Long, the law also reached
one newspaper that did not oppose him. Long announced that he tried to exempt that paper, but was
unable to devise a method to do so. Transcript of Record at 43. There were four newspapers with
circulation barely under 20,000. Appellee's Brief at 37. The district court questioned the distinction
drawn by the statute, stating no one will presume a paper whose circulation is 20,000 is not doing
precisely the same business as one whose circulation is slightly below that figure. American Press Co.
v. Grosjean, 10 F. Supp. 161, 164 (E.D. La. 1935), afl'd, 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
For a modern example of a law affecting the press that was suspicious because it affected an
astonishingly underinclusive class, see News America Publishing, Inc. v. F.C.C., 844 F.2d 800 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
181. 297 U.S. at 250.
182. Ely, supra note 42, at 1332.
183. A law treating the press like other businesses, however, would not present the same suspi-
cions. As Grosean noted, the press is not exempt from ordinary forms of taxation. 297 U.S. at 250.
184. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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newspapers on a different basis than it taxes other persons, and that con-
tent neutrality-a central claim of the state-was irrelevant in tax cases.
Further, the newspapers stated that the constitutionality of a tax is deter-
mined by its effect, and not by an absence of punitive intent.185
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor stated that Grosjean was not
controlling because while "motivation... may have been significant"' 86
in Grosjean, no legislative history existed in the Minnesota case. More
importantly, Justice O'Connor wrote that improper motivation is not the
sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment; even a law aimed at
proper governmental concerns can be unconstitutional if its effect is un-
duly restrictive. 187 Rather than addressing the effect of the law, though,
the Court emphasized the line-drawing issues.
Although newspapers may be subject to generally applicable economic
regulations, 88 the Minnesota tax was presumed invalid because it was
facially discriminatory. The Court believed that the power to tax differ-
entially gives the government a powerful weapon against the taxpayer
selected. And the Court concluded that differential treatment of the
press, unless justified by some special characteristic, suggests that the
goal of the regulation is related to suppression of expression.18 9
The state claimed, and Justice Rehnquist agreed, that this law actually
imposed a lesser burden on the press than a generally applicable sales
tax. 90 To Justice Rehnquist, the burden of the law on those affected,
rather than the line drawn, was the critical issue. Given the absence of
improper motivation, and the law's minimal burden, Justice Rehnquist
found no violation of the First Amendment.191 Justice O'Connor, how-
ever, advocated a prophylactic rule requiring that the press be treated
like other businesses. This position is premised on two concerns. First,
185. Brief of Appellant at 17, 49; Reply Brief of Appellant at 15, Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (No. 81-1839). The state's claim of
content neutrality is found in the Brief of Appellee at 9.
186. 460 U.S. at 580. See supra note 174.
187. 460 U.S. at 592.
188. Id. at 581. The Court concluded that the law singled out publications for treatment that is
unique in Minnesota tax law. Id.
189. Id. at 585, 588. The Court referred to the case as involving First Amendment principles
rather than equal protection interests. 460 U.S. at 585 n.7. See infra note 208.
190. 460 U.S. at 597-98 (Rehnquist J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist called the differential treat-
ment standard used by the Court "unprecedented and unwarranted." Id. at 598. Because there was
no infringement of a constitutional right, he believed that the law must meet only rational basis
scrutiny. Id. at 599-600.
191. -d. at 603.
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the Court believed that if the press received treatment that was less bur-
densome than the treatment given to nonpress entities, the press might
engage in self-censorship to avoid losing its special treatment. 192 Second,
the Court doubted the ability of courts to identify treatment of the press
that was more burdensome than the treatment given to other entities.
The possibility of judicial error poses too great a threat to concerns at the
heart of the First Amendment. 9 3  Minneapolis Star raises interesting
issues. The case is not based on a finding of any chilling effect. The
Court favored a prophylactic rule based on what might happen with dif-
ferential treatment of the press. This judicial assumption is similar to
that which animates overbreadth doctrine. Also, by emphasizing the im-
portance of treating the press like other businesses, Minneapolis Star re-
jects the view that the press needs special treatment. This calls into
question every exemption of the press from a generally applicable law,
such as the Newspaper Preservation Act 94 which exempts certain news-
papers from the antitrust laws. In addition, the concern for uniform
treatment cannot be confined to economic regulations; the chilling effect
the Court feared would likely occur in any setting where the press has
preferential treatment by legislative grace. Likewise, the Court's fear of
its inability to detect the burden of differential taxation can be applied to
other areas of regulation that present equally complex matters. While
one might discount the Court's modesty, as Justice Rehnquist did,19 the
value of a prophylactic rule is the heart of Minneapolis Star.19 6
Minneapolis Star also raises the problem of a law targeting only a
small number of newspapers. The Court relied upon this as an additional
ground, almost as an afterthought, 197 but Justice White, in a separate
opinion, found that this feature alone was sufficient to invalidate the
law.19 The same fears that guided the Court's determination that the
press be treated like other businesses also require that different segments
192. 460 U.S. at 588.
193. Id. at 589-90.
194. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1988).
195. 460 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (considering the complexity of the issues this
Court resolves each Term, this admonition is difficult to understand).
196. Uniform treatment is not, however, a condition sufficient to establish the constitutionality
of a law affecting the press. At some level, a uniformly applicable sales tax would place an intolera-
ble burden on First Amendment rights.
197. 460 U.S. at 591-92.
198. Id. at 593 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of the press be treated alike if there are no differences relevant to the
purpose of the law.
C. Arkansas Writers' Project
In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland 99 the Court addressed
an Arkansas statute exempting newspapers and religious, professional,
trade, and sport magazines from sales tax. The appellant claimed that
content discrimination was facially unconstitutional because there was
no meaningful distinction between newspapers and magazines. 2" The
state defended the law as a general tax that did not single out the press or
burden First Amendment rights.2 °0 Amici curiae in favor of the appel-
lant claimed that because many products, such as cotton, were exempt
from the sales tax, the state used exemptions to promote particular indus-
tries.2"2 Also, the tax exemption was flawed because it applied to only a
few publications.2" 3 Finally, amici curiae asserted that the power to end
the exemption gave the government the power to chill expression, espe-
cially for marginally profitable publications.2 4
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall stated that under Minneapolis
Star a law can be invalid for treating the press differently from other
enterprises or treating a small group of the press differently from other
members of the press. Selective taxation of either type poses the danger
of abuse by the government.205 Because the law applied to only a small
number of magazines,20 6 and did so on the basis of their content,20 7 the
199. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
200. Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221
(1987) (No. 85-1370).
201. Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (No. 85-1370).
202. Brief Amicus Curiae of the City and Regional Magazine Ass'n at 6-7, Arkansas Writers'
Project, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (No. 85-1370).
203. Brief Amicus Curiae of Times Mirror Co. and Newsweek, Inc. at 9, Arkansas Writers'
Project, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (No. 85-1370).
204. Brief Amicus Curiae of the City and Regional Magazine Ass'n at 23, Arkansas Writers'
Project, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (No. 85-1370).
205. 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987).
206. The appellant claimed it was the only Arkansas magazine subject to sales tax, but the tax
commissioner stated that three magazines paid the tax. The Court found that whether three
magazines or one magazine paid the tax was irrelevant because the burden fell on a limited group.
481 U.S. at 229 n.4. The Court regarded the Arkansas law as similar to the $100,000 exemption in
Minneapolis Star. Id. at 229.
207. The Court cited broad principles concerning content-based regulation, id. at 229-30, and in
particular found government scrutiny of content as a basis for imposing a tax entirely incompatible
with the First Amendment. Id. at 230.
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state was required to show that the law served a compelling interest in a
narrowly drawn fashion.2 °8
Relying upon Minneapolis Star, the Court stated that although raising
revenue is an important interest, the censorial threat of differential treat-
ment undercuts this interest. 2" The law was also flawed because of its
misfit. The state argued that the law was necessary to assist "fledgling"
publishers, but Justice Marshall found that it was both underinclusive
and overinclusive as a means of serving this interest. Magazines were
exempt on the basis of content, regardless of whether they were fledgling
or mature. Also, those publications that were fledgling but discussed
topics other than the exempt topics were ineligible for the tax
exemption. 210
Justice Scalia dissented, claiming that the majority proceeded on the
false premise that denial of an exemption from taxation is equivalent to
regulation. 21 1 He believed this law was not meant to inhibit nor did it
have the effect of inhibiting the appellant's publication.21 2 His dissent
overlooks the principle expressed by the majority in both this case and
Minneapolis Star-the actual impact of a law is irrelevant if differential
treatment of the press or a segment of the press is not justified by any
relevant characteristic. The rationale behind this principle is that the
Court fears the censorial threat of differential treatment. Justice Scalia
did acknowledge the appropriateness of prophylactic rules to prevent
208. Id. at 23 1. Justice Marshall commented that the appellant's First Amendment claims were
intertwined with interests arising under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 227 n.3. See also Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Jus-
tice Marshall stated that Arkansas Writers' Project would be analyzed primarily in First Amendment
terms. See supra note 189.
Although Justice Marshall presented the test as one involving the question whether the law was
narrowly drawn, he most likely meant that the law must be precisely tailored. As shown throughout
this Article, a law can be narrowly drawn and yet imprecisely tailored.
209. 481 U.S. at 231-32.
210. Id. at 232. The state also claimed its policy was to foster communication. The Court stated
that while this might justify a blanket exemption of the press from sales tax, it cannot justify selective
taxation of certain magazines. Because communication on only certain topics was fostered, the law
did not serve this purpose in any significant way. Id.
211. Id. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As long as the law was subject-matter based, rather than
viewpoint-based, Justice Scalia claimed that the government could determine which subjects to sub-
sidize. Id. at 236-38. The majority responded that the First Amendment's hostility to content-based
regulation extends to subject matter restrictions. 481 U.S. at 230.
212. Id. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believed that if the law were manipulated to
have a coercive effect, judicial relief would be possible. Id. This is similar to Justice Rehnquist's view
in Minneapolis Star. See 460 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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viewpoint-based exemptions.213
Because Arkansas Writers' Project and Minneapolis Star involved laws
treating a small group of one medium differently from other members of
the same medium, questions remained about the power of the state to
treat an entire medium differently from another medium.214 Leathers v.
Medlock 215 addressed those questions.
D. Leathers
Unlike Grosean with its concern for the role of the press in our soci-
ety, or the fear expressed in Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject for the potential dangers of differential treatment, Leathers suggests
that there are minimal First Amendment concerns when a medium is
treated differently from other media.
In 1987 Arkansas imposed a sales tax on cable service while exempting
print media and satellite services. The law was upheld by a chancery
court because cable uses public rights of way.21 6 The state supreme
court, however, ruled that this attribute was not controlling.21 7 Address-
ing the differential treatment of cable and satellite services, the state
supreme court held that a tax that discriminates between mass communi-
cators delivering substantially the same service runs afoul of the First
Amendment.218 Although the differential treatment of cable and satellite
service was eliminated in 1989 when the legislature made the sales tax
213. 481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214. After Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project, several tax laws treating one segment
of the press differently from other segments were successfully challenged. See, e.g., Louisiana Life,
Ltd. v. McNamara, 504 So.2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (sales tax on magazines but not on
newspapers found unconstitutional); Newsweek, Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. Sup. Ct.
1990) (same), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 1639 (1991); Southern Living, Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 251
(Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1990) (same), cert denied sub nom. Commissioner of Revenue v. Newsweek, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 1639 (1991); Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 787 P.2d 843 (Okla. Sup.
Ct. 1990) (tax distinguishing between publications sold for more than 75 cents and those selling for
less found unconstitutional); Oklahoma Broadcaster's Ass'n v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 789 P.2d
1312 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1990) (tax exemptions favoring print media over broadcast media found uncon-
stitutional). Other challenges were unsuccessful. See, eg., Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue &
Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa 1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 1639 (1991).
215. Ill S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
216. Although unpublished, the opinion is contained as an appendix to the petition for writ of
certiorari. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. C-10, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991)
(No. 90-38).
217. Medlock v. Pledger, 785 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Ark. 1990), affid in part & rev'd in part sub nom.
Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
218. Id. at 204.
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also applicable to satellite services, the print media exemption remains.
The state supreme court brushed aside the differential treatment of cable
and print, stating its unwillingness to hold that all mass communication
media must be taxed in the same way.219 The state supreme court did
not explain what characteristics distinguished cable from the print
media.
Before the Supreme Court, the state sought to defend the law by argu-
ing that cable's use of rights of way was a characteristic distinguishing
cable from print.220 Significantly, the state also argued that cable was
simply not part of the traditional press such as newspapers.221 It was
justifiable to exempt newspapers from the sales tax "because of the long-
standing relationship, exhibited by a lack of regulation, between govern-
ment and the traditional press. ' 22 2 Finally, the state argued that the tax
applied evenly to all cable operators.
The petitioners claimed that while distinctions may exist between cable
and print communicators for the purposes of other types of regulation,
there is no logical reason to differentiate between these segments of the
press for the purpose of imposing a sales tax.223 Moreover, the petition-
ers stated that the record revealed that cable transmits the same type of
content as other media. 224  Accordingly, it was inappropriate for the
state to selectively promote one medium over another. Amici curiae in
support of the petitioners questioned the validity of distinguishing cable
from other media because of cable's use of public property by noting that
many communicators use public property225 and that much of the prop-
219. Id.
220. Brief on the Merits by Appellant at 13-14, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No.
90-29). This point was also emphasized during oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7-9.
221. Brief on the Merits by Appellee at 4, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-
38).
222. Id. at 6. The state claimed that differential taxation was acceptable because the government
and cable are connected in a way that government and newspapers are not. Id. at 13. Amidi curiae
in favor of the state's position claimed that a cable franchise is a substantial commercial benefit
conferred by a city and thus justifies the distinct sales tax treatment. Brief of Amici Curiae the City
of New York, the National League of Cities and the United States Conference of Mayors at 9,
Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38).
223. Brief for Petitioners at 34, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38).
224. Id. at 25. Because of the similarity of content between cable and newspapers, the petitioner
argued that the state must show a compelling interest to justify the distinct treatment. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 40. The state contended that because the law was content neutral, a rational basis
for the distinction would be sufficient. Id. at 10.
225. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Cable Television Association at 23, Leathers v.
Medlock, II S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38).
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erty used by cable is privately owned.22 6
To the Supreme Court this case was unlike Grosean, Minneapolis
Star, or Arkansas Writers' Project. In Justice O'Connor's opinion, the
necessity of a prophylactic rule and the presumption of unconstitutional-
ity was absent. Instead, the Court viewed Leathers within the frame-
work established by Regan v. Taxation with Representation,227 which
treated tax exemptions for speakers as subsidies that are a matter of legis-
lative grace. Under this view of the case, cable had no First Amendment
right to be exempt from the tax. By using the Regan framework, the
Court fundamentally miscast the case. The key issue Leathers presented
was whether there should be a prophylactic rule to prevent the chilling of
speech by those media exempt from the tax.
The Court described the law as generally applicable because it applied
to a broad range of speech-related and nonspeech-related products and
services. Because cable was not singled out for taxation, the Court be-
lieved the law did not threaten the watchdog role of the press.228 This
overlooks the preferential treatment of the print media, which Minneapo-
lis Star teaches could cause self-censorship among the print media to
avoid loss of the tax exemption. Similarly, the Court's belief that the law
was not based on an interest in censoring cable229 ignores the possibility
that the print media exemption may have been motivated by a desire to
compromise the independence of the print media.
The Court believed that there was no danger of affecting a limited
range of views because the tax applied to all cable operators. 230 How-
ever, a tax on a particular medium that exempts its competitors affects
226. Brief of Amici Curiae the Competitive Cable Association and the Media Institute at 12,
Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38).
227. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
228. 111 S. Ct. at 1444. The Court claimed that the tax was unlikely to stifle the free exchange of
ideas. Id. at 1447. A tacit assumption of this position is that the tax would not cause subscribers to
drop cable service. This assumption is debatable because evidence in the record showed that the tax
did cause some subscribers to cancel cable service. Joint Appendix at 80-81 (describing price sensi-
tivity of cable customers and loss of subscribers due to sales tax). See generally SHEW, COsTs OF
CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISE REQUIREMENTS 17 (1984) (claiming that a franchise fee raises
prices, causing fewer households to subscribe). If subscribers drop cable service but acquire similar
information through another medium, the government's policy influences consumer preferences for
media. Even if the availability of substitutes prevents the policy from stifling the free exchange of
ideas, one may question why the government is permitted to affect consumer preferences for infor-
mation outlets.
229. 111 S. Ct. at 1447.
230. Id. at 1444.
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consumer preferences for information formats23 1 and can distort the
marketplace without targeting specific views. Why the government
should have this power is unanswered in Leathers. The Court's claim
that the law did not single out a narrow group because it reached all
cable operators232 is also unsatisfactory because it does not explain which
media are entitled to equal treatment.233 Because Leathers exhibits a
complete lack of interest in a prophylactic rule requiring that the state
treat similarly situated media equally, one may read the case as resting
on a presumption that cable is not a full-fledged member of the press.
Alternatively, the media at issue in Leathers may not be dispositive; one
may read the Court's opinion in terms of the importance of facial content
neutrality. That is, differential taxation of all members of any medium is
acceptable as long as it is not content based.234 Under this reading, the
Court would have reached the same result if cable were exempt from the
tax and the print media were taxed.
The Court's perception of viewpoint neutrality rests upon the claim
that cable programming does not differ systematically from that offered
by other media. This claim is dubious and irrelevant. First, trial courts
have a difficult time perceiving cable as part of the press, so the strategy
of the cable litigants was to show that cable transmits messages similar to
those carried by other media, especially those exempt from the sales tax.
No effort was made to establish the uniqueness of cable's messages.
Thus, the record presented to the Court did not reveal the uniqueness of
cable programming. Also, because the record established the similarity
231. Cable systems are generally subject to franchise fees, which can be as much as 5% of gross
revenues. When the franchise fee is added to the sales tax, Arkansas cable systems were subject to an
11% tax on gross receipts. Cable systems may also be subject to utility taxes. In California 25% of
a subscribers monthly bill is dedicated to taxation, much of which is imposed on a discriminatory
basis. Brief Amicus Curiae of the California Cable Television Association at 20, Leathers v.
Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38).
232. 111 S. Ct. at 1444.
233. Id. at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was critical of the majority's claim
that the state could treat media differently as long as the number of media actors affected was not too
"small." Id. Rather than looking at the total number of cable operators affected by the tax, Justice
Marshall examined local market structures. Because most communities are serviced by only one
cable company, the tax affected only a single actor in any given locale. Id. at 1452.
234. Just a few days after deciding Leathers, the Court denied certiorari to two cases involving
differential taxation of newspapers and magazines. In Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue &
Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1639 (1991), the Iowa Supreme Court
sustained the law because it was content neutral. In Newsweek v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1639 (1991), the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the law was
content based and therefore unconstitutional.
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of cable's content to that of other media, the Court saw no need to look
for viewpoint-discriminatory effects. Second, if cable programming is
identical to that of other media, what characteristics of cable justify the
differential treatment? Recall that Arkansas argued that cable's use of
public property and its lack of a tradition of freedom were sufficient justi-
fications for differential treatment. Strikingly, the Court was uninter-
ested in any justifications; a tax scheme that discriminates among
speakers "does not implicate the First Amendment unless it discrimi-
nates on the basis of ideas. 235
The Court's approach is backwards. Unless justified by distinguishing
characteristics relevant to the purpose of the law, the Court should inval-
idate even content-neutral differential taxation of communicators. As
Justice Marshall argued in his dissent, the Court should be skeptical of
differential treatment because media players seek politically conferred
advantages over their competitors.236 Justice Marshall also feared that
covert censorship occurs when the state favors those media it likes and
punishes those it dislikes.23 7 To guard against distortion of the market-
place,238 he presumed differential taxation was unconstitutional and re-
quired that the state bear the burden of proving that the treatment was
justified by some special characteristic of the medium or by some com-
pelling interest.239
Leathers is the second case in recent years in which the Court declined
an opportunity to clarify cable's First Amendment status. In City of Los
235. 111 S. Ct. at 1445. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (a tax
scheme does not become suspect simply because it exempts only some speech). Based on Regan, the
Court felt a strong presumption existed in favor of tax schemes. 111 S. Ct. at 1446. Also, drawing
upon equal protection cases, the Court stated that inherent in the power to tax is the power to
discriminate. See, eg., Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (in taxation, even more than in
other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification); New York Rapid Transit
Corp. v. New York City, 303 U.S. 573 (1938) (no iron rule of equality has ever been enforced on the
states in the field of taxation); Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898) (states
have wide discretion in selection and classifying objects of legislation).
236. 111 S. Ct. at 1452 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1449-50.
238. Justice Marshall wrote, "Under the First Amendment, government simply has no business
interfering with the process by which citizens' preferences for information formats evolve." Id. at
1453.
239. Id. at 1450. Justice Marshall did observe that the use of streets was insufficient justification
for the sales tax because cable paid a franchise fee for the use of streets. Id. While distinct regulatory
treatment might be tied to unique characteristics, there is no power in the state to burden cable with
a selective tax absent a clear nexus between the special characteristic and the tax. Id. at 1450 n.2.
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Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.,2" the Court determined it
needed more facts about cable's use of rights of way before deciding if a
potential operator's First Amendment rights were violated by an exclu-
sive franchising policy. The sparse record on these technical matters in
Leathers may explain the Court's unwillingness to address directly
cable's First Amendment status. The signal sent by Leathers, however,
is not encouraging. Many states currently impose significantly higher tax
burdens on cable than on other media.241 Leathers is bereft of any con-
cern for the possibility of even greater burdens on cable, or the political
dynamic that could explain why a new medium was taxed while its well-
established and politically powerful competitor was exempt.
The Court may have disregarded the state's claim that cable was not
part of the traditional press and viewed this as a content-neutral, gener-
ally applicable tax case. If this reading is correct, states are free to select
which media are exempt from taxation without regard to distinguishing
characteristics. This reading encourages those media with the greatest
political influence to seek taxes disfavoring their competitors. Whether
read narrowly as a cable case or broadly as a media case, Leathers allows
politicians to use their ability to craft exemptions as a way of chilling
speech.
III. EXEMPTIONS FOR THE PRESS
The Court has consistently rejected press claims for special First
Amendment status. Yet in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,242
the Court ruled that exempting broadcast stations, newspapers, and
magazines from a law prohibiting corporations from making candidate
expenditures was acceptable on equal protection grounds. One cannot
reconcile the answer to the equal protection question in Austin with First
Amendment doctrine. This Part argues that there are important reasons
for a result different from that reached in Austin.
240. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
241. See, eg., Brief of Amici Curiae Cablevision Industries Corp., Comcast Corp., and Cox
Communications, Inc. at 8-15, Leathers v. Medlock, II1 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38) (discussing
differential taxation of cable in numerous states); Brief Amicus Curiae of the California Cable Televi-
sion Association at 12-20, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38) (discussing
differential taxation in California); Brief of the Indiana Cable Television Association, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae at 1, Leathers v. Medlock, I11 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38) (discussing differential taxation
in Indiana).
242. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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A. Bellotti
First National Bank v. Bellotti24 3 was the first opinion in which the
Court addressed an exemption for the press. In Bellotti, nonpress corpo-
rations were prohibited from speaking on certain referenda. The state
defended the law by arguing that nonpress corporations do not have First
Amendment rights.2' The appellant, however, claimed that the public's
interest in receiving ideas forms the foundation for First Amendment
protection of corporate expression. Thus, the distinction between busi-
nesses that are part of the press and those that are not was ill-founded.
"[I]t is of little or no significance whether the source of the information is
a media or non-media source. It is the right to receive the message which
counts.
'245
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell did not ask whether corporations
have First Amendment rights. Instead, he asked whether the statute
abridged expression the First Amendment was designed to protect. The
answer was simple: "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual. ' 246 Be-
cause of the emphasis on the right to receive expression, Justice Powell
concluded that the press does not hold a monopoly on either the First
Amendment or the ability to enlighten.247 If viewed from the perspective
of the right to receive expression, characteristics that otherwise might be
a basis for distinguishing media corporations from nonmedia corpora-
tions, such as shareholder consent,24 are irrelevant.
On its face, Bellotti indicates that all communicators are similarly situ-
ated because of the audience's right to receive expression. However, this
ties the assessment of similarity to a rather tenuous foundation. As pre-
viously shown, the right to receive expression "consists of a bundle of
concepts, each of which has vitality in a narrow context. ' 249 A more
certain foundation exists in Bellotti's concern for self-government. Ac-
243. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
244. Brief for the Appellee at 13, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (No. 76-1172).
245. Brief for Appellants at 42.
246. 435 U.S. at 777.
247. Id. at 782. In particular, some voters would be as interested in hearing appellants' views as
the views of the possibly less knowledgeable media. Id. at 782 n.18.
248. For a discussion of the rights of shareholders in media and nonmedia corporations, see
Brudney, supra note 53, at 240 (stockholder consent is not necessary before media corporations
communicate with the public).
249. Lee, supra note 30, at 343.
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cording to Justice Powell, the government is forbidden from restricting
the public's access to expression "lest the people lose their ability to gov-
ern themselves."2 ' The self-government perspective regards any effort
by the government to dictate the subjects about which a person may
speak as illegitimate.
In addition to the self-government perspective, two other aspects of
Bellotti have significance for a discussion of Austin. The record in Bel-
lotti did not indicate that corporate involvement created undue influ-
ence.25 ' Moreover, the Court believed the undue influence argument
would have an unsettling impact if applied to the news media. "One
might argue with comparable logic that the State may control the volume
of expression by the wealthier, more powerful corporate members of the
press in order to 'enhance the relative voices' of the small and less influ-
ential members." '252
The dispute in Bellotti about the First Amendment status of press and
nonpress corporations also helps explain Austin. In a concurring opin-
ion, Chief Justice Burger argued that the First Amendment does not be-
long to any definable category of persons or entities. It belongs to all
who exercise its freedoms.25 3 In his dissent, however, Justice Rehnquist
stated that there is an important distinction between the First Amend-
ment rights of the press and other speakers. When a state charters a
corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily as-
sumes that the corporation is entitled to liberty of the press essential to
the conduct of its business.254 Justice Kennedy, in his Austin dissent,
250. 435 U.S. at 791 n.31.
251. Id. at 789-90.
252. Id. at 791 n.30.
253. Id. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
254. Id. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White in dissent claimed that there was no
self-realization in corporate expression, id. at 807 (White, J., dissenting), a claim that the majority
noted could also apply to press communication. 435 U.S. at 783 n.19.
Following Bellotti there was an outpouring of commentary on whether the expression of press
corporations should be treated differently from that of nonpress corporations. Compare Brudney,
supra note 53, (stockholder consent required before a nonmedia corporation can engage in political
speech, stockholder consent is not necessary with media corporations) with F.W. Dietmar Schaefer,
The First Amendment, Media Conglomerates and "Business" Corporations: Can Corporations Safely
Involve Themselves in the Political Process? 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1980) (expression of nonmedia
corporations and media corporations is equally protected). Other commentators who propose a dis-
tinction between the rights of press corporations and nonpress corporations acknowledge that they
lack a clear conception of the "press." See, eg., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH 357 n.72 (1989).
Many have written about the issue of special status for the press and a common point of disagree-
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would restate Chief Justice Burger's position. The Austin majority
would repackage in equal protection terms Justice Rehnquist's distinc-
tion between press and nonpress corporations.
B. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life2"5 involved a federal statute
prohibiting corporations and unions from using treasury funds for ex-
penditures in connection with any federal election.2" 6 News stories, com-
mentaries, and editorials distributed by broadcasters, newspapers,
magazines, and other periodical publications, are not considered expendi-
tures.2"7 In Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), a prolife group is-
sued a special edition of its newsletter rating candidates on prolife issues
and urging voters to vote prolife in an upcoming primary. The Federal
Election Commission (FEC) brought an enforcement action against the
group, and the district court ruled that the special edition was within the
press exemption.258 The court of appeals held that the special edition
ment is over the definition of the press. Floyd Abrams claims that the definitional difficulties are not
insurmountable. Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Auton-
omous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580-81 (1979). This simply misses the point. Of course the
press can be defined, but every definition has some consequences. As Professor Lange wrote, if the
term press is defined broadly enough to include the pamphleteer, the definition will approach
"speech" to the point that exclusions are arbitrary and unjustified. If the definition is narrowed to
exclude the pamphleteer, the result is perverse because the Framers recognized pamphlets as part of
the press. David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 106 (1975). See also
Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 607 (1979) (broad
definition of the press loses the point that the First Amendment has special protection for the news
media). As Professor Nicholson has written, the problem is not the impracticability of making a
distinction between the press and other businesses, but in finding a theory that will justify a distinc-
tion. Marlene Arnold Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the Federal Restriction on Corporate and
Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 945, 961 (1980).
255. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
256. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988). Corporations may establish separate segregated funds, commonly
known as PACs, if they want to financially participate in the electoral process. For commentary on
this statute, especially in light of Bellotti, see Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Kenneth D. Karpay, Corpo-
rate Political Free Speech. 2 U.S.C § 441b and the Superior Rights of Natural Persons, 14 PAc. L.J.
209 (1983); Roy B. Birnbaum, The Constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act After First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 149 (1979); Bolton, supra note 35; Nichol-
son, supra note 254; Benjamin M. Vandegrift, The Corporate PoliticalAction Committee, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 422 (1980).
257. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1988). For a discussion of cases in which this exemption was at
issue, see Martin Boles, Regulating Newsletters Under the Federal Election Laws and the First
Amendment, 40 ARK. L. REv. 79 (1986).
258. 589 F. Supp. 646, 650 (D. Mass. 1984), affid, 769 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U,.
238 (1986).
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was not within the press exemption, but found the law unconstitutional
as applied because the newsletter did not implicate any of the govern-
mental interests underlying the statute, such as the creation of political
debts.259
Before the Supreme Court, the FEC claimed that if newsletters like
these were within the news media exemption, the prohibition on expendi-
tures would be virtually eliminated because any corporation or union
that operated an in-house organ could use its treasury funds to distribute
unlimited express advocacy to the general public. 2 ° Because the prolife
group was not in the business of distributing newsletters, its actions were
pure election advocacy.26 1 The prolife group claimed that liberty of press
is not the special province of the traditional institutional press, but a fun-
damental right that comprehends every sort of publication.262 Moreover,
the legislative history, though sparse, evinces an intent to give the terms
'newspaper' and 'periodical publication' the widest definition.263
The Supreme Court held that the special edition did not fit within the
press exemption, nonetheless the statute was unconstitional as applied to
the prolife group. The group did not pose the danger of corruption of the
political process, nor did the group divert contributor's funds because
contributors were aware that the group was spending their money for
political purposes.2 "4 Although Justices Rehnquist, White, Blackmun,
and Stevens found the prohibition constitutional as applied to the prolife
group, all members of the Court agreed that the special edition did not
fall within the press exemption. No member of the Court questioned the
validity of the statutory exemption for the press.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan agreed with the FEC that it
was necessary to narrowly construe the press exemption, otherwise the
door would open "for those corporations and unions with in-house publi-
cations to engage in unlimited spending directly from their treasuries to
259. 769 F.2d 13, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
260. Brief for Appellant at 18, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (No.
85-701). It is permissible for such groups to distribute election materials if financed through a sepa-
rate segregated fund. The FEC cited the proliferation of PACs as evidence that the law did not limit
the free flow of political information. Id. at 24.
261. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8.
262. Brief for Appellee at 37, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (No.
85-701). At oral argument, counsel for the prolife group stated: "Freedom of the press is not a
captive of the media conglomerates." Transcript of Oral Argument at 39.
263. Brief for Appellee at 20, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (No.
85-701).
264. 479 U.S. 238, 258-61 (1986).
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distribute campaign material to the general public, thereby eviscerating
[section] 441b's prohibition." '265 Consequently the Court focused on fac-
tors such as disparity between the circulation of the regular newsletter
and the special edition, the difference in staffs, and the fact that the spe-
cial edition lacked the masthead that appeared on the regular
newsletter.266
These factors can be regarded as superficial, but the distinction be-
tween press expression and expression by nonpress organizations rests on
deeper concerns. The Court's opinion accepts the traditional fear of
campaign participation by nonpress business corporations. Bellotti cer-
tainly raises provocative questions about the validity of that fear, but the
Court avoided reconciling Bellotti with the statute. Also, by not ques-
tioning the press exemption, the Court was tacitly agreeing that speech
by the press does not taint the political marketplace. Or stated differ-
ently, any tainting caused by the press is the price that must be paid for a
free press. The statutory exemption stands at odds with the First
Amendment doctrine that the press is not special.
The narrow definition of the press in MCFL was not harmful to the
prolife group because the Court was willing to address whether speech by
the prolife group damaged the political process. MCFL, however, con-
cluded that the group was unlike a business corporation,267 leaving the
distinct impression that the Court would not closely examine a restric-
tion on other types of corporations.268
C. Austin
Michigan Chamber of Commerce v. Austin 269 concerned the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce's attempt to advocate the election of a candidate
by placing an advertisement in a newspaper. A state statute, however,
265. Id. at 251.
266. Id. at 250-551.
267. The Court distinguished the prolife group from business corporations because it: 1) was
formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas; 2) had no shareholders; and, 3) was not
established by a business corporation or union and did not accept contributions from those groups.
Id. at 264.
268. The Bellotti Court stated that it was not addressing the validity of restrictions on corporate
participation in candidate elections. 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978). Also as the MCFL Court noted,
there is a difference between completely preventing corporate expression about candidates and re-
quiring that corporations channel such expression through PACs. 479 U.S. at 259 n.12. The two
cases left unresolved the validity of laws requiring that business corporations use PACs for expres-
sion about candidates.
269. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
[Vol. 71:637
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/4
DOCTRINE OF UNDERBREADTH
prohibits corporations from making expenditures in support of or in op-
position to candidates. Corporations may establish separate segregated
funds, commonly known as political action committees (PACs), for such
activities. The Michigan law allows expenditures by broadcast stations,
newspapers, magazines, or other periodicals for news stories, commenta-
ries and editorials concerning candidates.
The Chamber filed suit to prevent enforcement of the law and the dis-
trict court found the law constitutional. 7 0 The district court believed
the distinction between corporations and unincorporated entities was jus-
tified by the threat of corporate power to the political process. The court
considered the press exemption on equal protection grounds and con-
cluded that the distinction was not between media and nonmedia corpo-
rations; the law would exempt any corporation's expression if it regularly
published a periodical or operated a broadcast station.2 7 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the law unconstitutional as applied
to the nonprofit Chamber.7
Before the Supreme Court, the state claimed that the ability of the
Chamber to engage in political speech was not inhibited by the require-
ment that corporations make expenditures through separate segregated
funds .2 3 Further, the state defended the press exemption as a recogni-
tion of the First Amendment right of the media to publish news and
commentary about politics.2 74 The law did not unconstitutionally dis-
criminate between similar entities, but protected the integrity of the polit-
ical process while leaving the media free to cover state election
campaigns.2 75
The Chamber claimed that the law interfered with a corporation's abil-
ity to speak effectively, or perhaps even to speak at all. Between 25 per-
cent and 50 percent of a PAC's funds are spent on its establishment and
administration. Consequently, not all corporations can afford to form
PACs, and those least able to form PACs are also least likely to cause
270. 643 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
271. Id. at 405.
272. 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
273. Brief for Appellants at 57, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(No. 88-1569).
274. Reply Brief for Appellants at 24-25, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990) (No. 88-1569).
275. Id.
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corruption.2 76 Because press corporations could communicate about
candidates without having to establish PACs, the Chamber claimed the
press had preferred status, contrary to First Amendment doctrine.277
Moreover, the Chamber argued, it was untenable to claim that media
corporations are less likely to corrupt the political process than other
corporations.27 8
At oral argument, Justice O'Connor inquired about the media exemp-
tion. Counsel for the state explained that while a newspaper could not
place a candidate advertisement in another newspaper, it could publish
endorsements as part of the regular course of its business. This prompted
members of the Court to question why press editorials and similar com-
mentary were not regarded as distorting the electoral process.279 Justice
Kennedy in particular was concerned about the power of the state to
dictate the circumstances of expression: "Well, you're saying-you're
saying that corporations have too much power, that there is too much
speech, that this is an evil, the corporations gather great deals of money,
that they are created by the state. Therefore we give legislative defer-
ence. All of those arguments can be made to support the proposition
that the AMA Journal, that the ACLU newsletter, ought to be regulated
by the state. ' 2 0 When counsel for the state said it would only assert this
power in the context of candidate elections, Justice Kennedy stated, "We
are talking about a matter of principle."28
In an opinion that stands Bellotti's principles on their heads, 2 2 the
Supreme Court upheld the law by a 6-3 vote with Justice Marshall writ-
ing for the Court and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and O'Connor dissenting.
The majority opinion addressed the separate segregated fund require-
276. Appellee's Brief at 28, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(No. 88-1569).
277. Id. at 7.
278. Id. at 38. Counsel for the Chamber did not mention the press exemption during oral argu-
ment, but did note that unlike federal law, the Michigan law did not affect unincorporated labor
union speech. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24-25. Because the state's interest was the impact of
wealth on the political process, the law was arguably underinclusive because it did not restrict unions
that have substantial wealth. Id. at 25.
279. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11.
280. Id. at 16.
281. Id.
282. Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 Sup. CT.
REV. 105, 115 (noting that Bellotti's vitality is threatened by Austin); Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's
Monster Hits the Campaign Trail" An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 613 (1991) (the principles of Austin stand in absolute contradiction to
the principles set out in Bellotti).
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ment as a First Amendment issue, but treated the press exemption as an
equal protection issue.
The Court admitted that the separate segregated fund requirement
burdened corporate expression. As a consequence, the Court's test was
demanding on its face-the law must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest.2z 3 However, because the law channeled corporate
expression through PACs and was not viewed as a complete ban, the
Court was quite generous in its treatment of the state's interest and the
law's tailoring. In contrast, the dissenters regarded the law as creating a
complete ban on corporate political expenditures because speech by a
PAC is distinct from speech by a corporation. 8 4
Instead of preventing the financial quid pro quo,2 8 5 the state's interest
was "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas. 28 6 By requiring that expenditures come from a separate
segregated fund, the Court believed the law insured that expenditures
reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corpora-
tions.28 7 Justice Marshall's phrasing of the state's interest blends two
distinct concepts. The first concept concerns the accumulation of wealth
through state-conferred advantages. Certainly corporations are not
alone in receiving special advantages from the state. The second concept
concerns public support for political expenditures. This argument could
justify prohibitions on wealthy individuals whose expenditures might not
be proportional to public support for their political ideas. By combining
both concepts the Court sought, according to Justice Scalia's dissent, to
create one good argument out of two bad ones. 88
The Court's treatment of independent expenditures as "corrosive and
283. 494 U.S. at 658-61.
284. Justice Scalia observed that the law prohibited the corporation, as a corporation, from en-
gaging in political speech. "What the Michigan law permits the corporation to do is to serve as the
founder and treasurer of a different assocation of individuals that can endorse or oppose political
candidates." Id. at 681 n.* (Scalia, J., dissenting). Speech by the separate segregated fund is not
speech by the corporation.
285. 494 U.S. at 659. See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985) (hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors).
286. 494 U.S. at 660.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He added, "When the vessel labeled 'corruption' begins to
founder under weight too great to be logically sustained, the argumentation jumps to the good ship
"special privilege"; and when that in turn begins to go down, it returns to "corruption." Id. at 685.
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distorting" is a striking departure from its earlier position in Buckley v.
Valeo289 concerning the harmlessness of independent expenditures.290
The record in Austin did not indicate that independent expenditures by
corporations distort the political process.2 91 The lack of a record, how-
ever, was insignificant to the Court. In rejecting the claim that the law
was overinclusive because not all corporations have the wealth to distort
the political process, the Court stated that because all corporations have
special benefits, they have the potential to cause distortion.2 92 There are
less restrictive alternatives to prevent distortion. As Justices Scalia and
Kennedy wrote, the law should not affect speech that lacks the potential
to distort political discourse, such as that by small corporations.2 9 Fur-
thermore, if the concern is protecting shareholders, state corporation
law, rather than the separate segregated fund requirement, is a less re-
strictive alternative.294
The Court addressed the media exemption as an equal protection is-
sue, requiring that the distinction be justified by a compelling interest.295
Media corporations have the same state-conferred benefits as other cor-
porations, but Justice Marshall wrote that media corporations differ from
other corporations in that their "resources are devoted to the collection
of information and its dissemination to the public. '296 This justification
for the press exemption was considered in a vacuum rather than in refer-
ence to the state's interest in preventing distortion of the political pro-
cess. Given the state's interest, how is the allocation of corporate
289. 424 U.S. 1, 45-47 (1976).
290. 494 U.S. at 682-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 702 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
291. Recall that no record of distortion existed in Bellotti. See supra text accompanying note
251. Bolton claims that there is no evidence in the majority of states, which do not regulate corpo-
rate political expenditures, that corporations exert undue influence or that there is more corruption
than in states that regulate corporate expenditures. Bolton, supra note 35, at 413.
292. 494 U.S. at 661. Neither was the law viewed as fatally underinclusive because it allowed
labor unions to make direct expenditures from their large treasuries. Unions did so without the
benefit of state conferred advantages and their members could refuse to support political activities,
Id. at 665.
293. Id. at 688 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 704-05 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
294. For an explanation of how state corporation law would control campaign expenditures, see
Fisch, supra note 282, at 634-42.
295. 494 U.S. at 666. Curiously missing from the Court's equal protection analysis is any claim
that stockholders in nonmedia corporations do not expect corporate resources to be used for political
speech. Justice Brennan emphasized the importance of protecting shareholders in his concurring
opinion. Id. at 673-76 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion of stockholder rights in media and
nonmedia corporations, see Brudney, supra note 53.
296. 494 U.S. at 667.
[Vol. 71:637
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/4
DOCTRINE OF UNDERBREADTH
resources a relevant distinction? The Court would have us believe that
there is potential harm to elections by a nonpress corporation that de-
votes only 1 percent of its resources to communication. In contrast, the
Court does not view a press corporation that devotes 100 percent of its
resources to communication as potentially harming elections. Would not
the resources available, rather than the percentage of resources devoted
to communication, better indicate the potential for distortion? Also,
given the variation among members of the press on factors such as audi-
ence size, would not some press outlets be more likely to cause distortion
than others?
A serious problem is raised by the the Court's effort to use resource
allocation as a ground to distinguish media corporations from other cor-
porations. At what point does a corporation devote enough of its re-
sources to the dissemination of information to qualify for the exemption?
Answering this question is not as easy as it might seem. For example,
how does one classify a conglomerate that operates media properties in
addition to other lines of business?2 97 The Court ignored this problem by
perceiving corporations as either devoting all of their resources to com-
munication (the press), or a far smaller amount (nonpress corpora-
tions).298 The Court's resource distinction may be a facade for the social
perception that press involvement in politics is acceptable, while involve-
ment by nonpress corporations is feared.
After briefly raising the matter of how corporations allocate their re-
sources, the Court quickly shifted to another reason for distinguishing
the press from nonmedia corporations. According to the Court, the
press plays a unique role in informing the public about newsworthy
events.2 99 As with the resources distinction, the role of the press was
presented in a vacuum and not in relation to the interest in preventing
distortion. Because of the important role the press plays in the dissemi-
297. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy observed that the web of corporate ownership that links
media and nonmedia corporations is difficult to untangle for the purpose of any meaningful distinc-
tion. Id. at 712-13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The Court's resource distinction also points out a flaw in the statute's definition of the press.
Other communications enterprises, such as cable television systems and on-line computer informa-
tion services, devote their resources to the collection and dissemination of information. These new
technologies, which are similarly situated to newspapers and broadcast stations in terms of the
Court's rationale, are excluded from the state's press exemption.
298. Many nonpress corporations have extensive communications programs as part of their pub-
lic relations strategy. See ScoTr M. CUTLIP & ALLEN H. CENTER, EFFECTIVE PUBLIc RELATIONS
402-450 (5th ed. 1978).
299. 494 U.S. at 667.
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nation of political information, would not the press be more likely to
distort elections than nonpress corporations?3"
While the Court was distinguishing the press from other corporations,
it also claimed that the press does not have First Amendment rights su-
perior to the First Amendment rights of others. 31  The Court's claim
means that the state may treat the press differently from other speakers,
but is not constitutionally required to do so. This obscures more than it
illuminates. First, the notion that the exemption was purely a matter of
legislative grace seems bizarre. A requirement that the press channel its
political commentary through PACs is transparently invalid."0 2 Second,
to conclude that the press plays a unique role represents value judgments
about the need for press freedom, the danger of nonpress corporate ex-
pression, and the significance of speech by each. These value judgments
intensely involve the substantive definition of First Amendment rights. 3
Austin is a prime example of why the Court should not address con-
cerns central to the First Amendment under the Equal Protection
Clause. If the Court had approached the distinction under the First
300. To Justice Scalia, media wealth was more likely to produce the "New Corruption" than
wealth that is generally making money through other endeavors. Id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. 494 U.S. at 668. Justice Scalia referred to the theory of the "New Corruption" as a dagger
at the throats of the press because the press exemption was not constitutionally required. Id. at 691
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
302. As Justice Kennedy stated, "The First Amendment would not tolerate a law prohibiting a
newspaper or television network from spending on political comment because it operates through a
corporation." Id. at 712 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
303. It is apparent that value choices underpin the Court's perception of the unique role of the
press. Consider the applicability of the state's interest to the press. Because the role of the press is to
inform the public, it has the potential to distort political debate. As Justice Scalia stated, "media
corporations not only have vastly greater power to perpetuate the evil of overinforming, they also
have vastly greater opportunity." Id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The concern that a corpora-
tion's ideas reflect public support also applies to the press. For example, a television station whose
news operation loses money must subsidize the news with revenue obtained from the sale of advertis-
ing during other types of programming. In this illustration, the resources available to support the
station's political coverage and commentary have little to do with public support for the station's
political ideology. A separate segregated fund requirement would serve to prevent the diversion of
resources to political purposes.
By concluding that the state was justified in exempting the press, the Court assigned greater value
to press communication than communication by others. Its equal protection analysis in Austin
takes the following form:
1) When differentiating among speakers, a compelling interest must be served;
2) The press is unlike other speakers because of its unique role in informing society; and
3) Given that the press is unlike nonpress corporations, the statute does not violate equal
protection.
The critical prong of this analysis is the second, which concludes that the press has a unique social
role. This assigns greater value to press communication than communication by others.
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Amendment, the answer seems straightforward. First Amendment doc-
trine treats all speakers as equally valuable and consequently entitled to
equal freedom of expression. Because the state could not require that the
media channel their political expression through PACs, and the First
Amendment rights of the media are no different from those enjoyed by
others, the state could not impose this requirement on nonmedia
corporations.3 o°
The Austin Court was oblivious to the impact of the press exemption
on political communication, a concern that would have been appropri-
ately addressed under the First Amendment self-governing rationale.
Because the law left the press free to discuss candidates, but burdened
other types of businesses with the separate segregated fund requirement,
political debate was skewed. For example, the PAC requirement elimi-
nated the speech of small corporations who lacked the resources to estab-
lish separate segregated funds. On some issues small corporations may
possess information that is unavailable elsewhere. It is unreasonable to
assume that the press will cover the views of these corporations because
the press may want to avoid some issues or views due to conflicting busi-
ness interests. For those corporations with the resources to establish sep-
arate segregated funds, the impact of their expression is lessened because
the audience attaches little credibility to PAC expression.3"5 Further, the
special treatment of the press raises the prospect of a chilling effect, a
consideration at the heart of Minneapolis Star.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice White's concurring opinion in R.A. V, contrasted overbreadth,
which seeks to avoid the chilling of protected speech, with "under-
breadth," which allows unprotected speech to remain unpunished until
the legislature drafts a broader law. One should read his criticism of
"underbreadth" in the context of unprotected expression. As shown
throughout this Article, examining what a law excludes is a critical part
304. Justice Kennedy implicitly made the same point in his dissent. 494 U.S. at 712-13 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting).
305. Communication research shows that source identity influences whether an audience will
accept a position advocated in a persuasive message. See, eg., MARVIN KARLINS & HERBERT I.
ABELSON, PERSUASION: How OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES ARE CHANGED (1970). Justice Kennedy
observed that the record showed that PACs suffer from a poor public image. 494 U.S. at 708 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting).
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of determining whether a law is precisely tailored. In certain situations,
exclusions do pose the danger of chilling protected speech.
Any law of general applicability 0 6 that can be validly applied to the
press should be. It may seem bizarre to advocate elimination of press
exemptions as a way of preserving press freedom, but the prophylactic
rule requiring the press be treated like other businesses is premised on the
chilling effect created by exemptions. Furthermore, because exemptions
from valid laws are a matter of legislative grace rather than a constitu-
tional requirement, application of the law to the press does not harm
First Amendment freedoms.
Conversely, any law that cannot be validly applied to the press should
not be applied to other communicators. In other words, where a law
could not be constitutionally broadened to include the press, the Court
should be intensely skeptical of its application to other speakers. Other-
wise, differentiation between the press and other speakers creates a two-
tiered structure of First Amendment rights. At its heart, Austin creates
two separate tiers of First Amendment rights, but does so under the
facade of equal protection. Because the Court does not believe the press
should have special First Amendment rights, addressing whether a law
could be validly applied to the press is a potent way of defining its consti-
tutionality for other communicators. Courts are sensitive to the need for
press freedom; this sensitivity should extend to other communicators.
Freedom of expression means "freedom for all, and not for some."307
The central importance of a law's burden on expression and viewpoint
neutrality explain much of the Court's assessment of laws treating com-
municators differentially. A disturbing undercurrent, though, is the sig-
nificance the Court attaches to particular communicators. In Austin the
perception of the relative insignificance of corporate political expression,
and the danger of that expression, may explain why the scrutiny was
strict in name only. The opinion's rhetoric is revealing; nonpress corpo-
rations are described as funnels for political war chests,308 while the press
is "a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the
306. Of course, general applicability is not a sufficient condition to guarantee a law's constitu-
tionality; such laws must also have an incidental impact on expression. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) (state promissory estoppel law is a generally applicable law
that does not burden publishing; enforcement of such laws against the press is not subject to stricter
scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons).
307. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
308. 494 U.S. at 659.
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people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve." ' 9
A possible explanation is that the Court is drawing upon social con-
ventions concerning the appropriate roles of different enterprises. There
is a highly emotional appeal to the phrase freedom of the press. Addi-
tionally, our society is accustomed to the press playing an active role in
the political process. The relatively new phenomenon of nonmedia busi-
nesses participating in politics has neither the emotional appeal nor social
acceptance of press freedom. As Professor Lindblom wrote, large corpo-
rations do not fit into the prevailing vision of democracy.310 Similarly,
new communications technologies are perceived differently from estab-
lished media. It is remarkable that a central part of the state's argument
in Leathers was that cable lacked a tradition of freedom. Claims such as
this reveal the treatment of the new medium as basically premised on its
newness. Unfortunately, by its total lack of interest in the state's justifi-
cations, the Leathers opinion does nothing to prevent equally disordered
treatment of other new media. Government action that favors some
communicators should be disfavored.
309. Id. at 668.
310. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 356 (1977).
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